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From Seriatim to Consensus and Back Again: A Theory of Dissent
M. Todd Henderson∗
I.

Introduction

When John Roberts acceded to the position of Chief Justice of the United States,
he stated that one of his top priorities was to reduce the number of dissenting opinions
issued by members of the Court.1 Roberts believes dissent is a symptom of dysfunction.2
This belief is shared with many justices past and present, the most famous of which is
his predecessor John Marshall, who squelched virtually all dissent during his 35 years as
Chief Justice.3 One of their arguments is that dissent weakens the Court by exposing
internal divisions publicly.4 The Court would be better, perhaps more efficient at
deciding cases and making law, if it spoke with one voice. This is a common refrain in
American constitutional history. Justice Louis Brandeis famously wrote that “[i]t is
more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right,”
stating that he would join opinions he disagreed with just for the sake of settling the
law.5 Other justices have called dissents “subversive literature” 6 and “useless” 7, and, we
presume, acted just like Brandeis.
Another reason for the hostility to dissent is the concern that allowing dissent
means the majority is free to be bolder in its decision, since it is not forced to
compromise. In a recent speech at Georgetown Law School, Chief Justice Roberts stated
the ground for this claim: "Division should not be artificially suppressed, but the rule of
law benefits from a broader agreement. The broader the agreement among the justices,
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1
See Hope Yen, Roberts Seeks Greater Consensus on Court, WASH. POST, May 21, 2006, available
at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/05/21/AR2006052100678.html; see
also, Chief Justice John Roberts, Address to Georgetown University Class of 2006 (May 21, 2006)
available at http://www.law.georgetown.edu/webcast/eventDetail.cfm?eventID=144.
2
See Address to Georgetown University, Class of 2006, supra note 1.
3
See Part III.C. infra. As discussed below, Marshall used leadership, example, and other
techniques to discourage dissent and build a collegial and consensus Court. There was some dissent, but
as shown herein, it was trivial.
4
Learned Hand believed that dissent “cancels the impact of monolithic solidarity on which the
authority of a bench of judges so largely depends.” LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 72 (1958).
5
Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
6
In an interview, Stewart characterized dissents in this way, quoting an unnamed law professor of
his. See Robert Bendiner, The Law and Potter Stewart An Interview With Justice Potter Stewart,
AMERICAN HERITAGE, available at
http://www.americanheritage.com/articles/magazine/ah/1983/1/1983_1_98.shtml (“Q: Isn’t it a matter
of concern, then, that the government should tempt people into committing an offense?
A: It’s a matter of great concern to me. I wrote a dissenting opinion in a similar case, but it was a
dissenting opinion, and when I went to law school we had a professor who said dissenting opinions are
nothing but subversive literature.”).
7
See Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (opinion of Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes, the “Great Dissenter”).
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the more likely it is a decision on the narrowest possible grounds."8 Of course, this does
not tell us the why, only the how. We can guess that the why has something to do with
Bickel’s “passive virtues” and Sunstein’s one-case-at-a-time minimalism, with an eye
toward sharing with, or even delegating to, others decision-making power over
controversial social issues. Whatever the reason, Roberts, like Marshall before him,
believes that changing the nature of the judicial opinions released to the public—the
discourse of law—is how to achieve his unstated goals.
To other past and present justices, most famously Chief Justice Stone and Justice
William Brennan, dissent is considered a healthy, and even necessary, practice that
improves the way in which law is made.9 We get better law, ceteris paribus, with dissent
than without.10 Their counter-position rests in part on two ideas: first, dissents
communicate legal theories to other justices, lawyers and political actors, state courts,
and future justices, and have sometimes turned into good law later on as a result of this;
and second, dissents are essential to reveal the deliberative nature of the Court, which in
turn improves its institutional authority and legitimacy within American governance.
Justice Brennan describes the first idea as justices “contributing to the marketplace of
competing ideas” in an attempt to get at the truth or right answer.11 Chief Justice
Charles Evans Hughes captured this latter point when he observed that dissent, when a
matter of conviction, is needed “because what must ultimately sustain the court in
public confidence is the character and independence of the judges.”12 Dissent, in this
interpretation, is essential to getting the best possible legal rule and ensuring the Court’s
legitimacy.
So who is right? Is dissent a symptom of a dysfunctional Court or of a healthy
one? Is dissent essential to getting the best possible legal rule or is it likely to lead to
murky or bad legal rules? History tells us a little bit. We observe that throughout its
history the Supreme Court has sometimes issued predominantly unanimous opinions,
while at other times issued separate opinions in most cases. Since the trend is toward
the latter, one conclusion might be that there has been learning and evolution—that the
practice today is better in some sense than the practice in the past. In other words,
judicial opinions have moved toward a more efficient method of deciding and
announcing legal rules.
The almost thousand-year history of separate opinions by English courts gives us
reason to doubt this. Another possibility is that Court practices are tailored to the
particular times, and that what was the best method then is not the best method today.
8

See Hope, supra note 1.
See William J. Brennan Jr, In Defense of Dissents, 37 HASTINGS L. J. 427, 438 (1986) (defending
dissents on multiple grounds and calling dissent a “duty”); see also Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a
Judicial Voice, 67 NYU L. REV. 1185 (1992) (presenting several arguments justifying the current practice
of frequent dissenting opinions); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on Writing Separately, 65 WASH. L.
REV. 133 (1990) (same).
10
Cass Sunstein makes a more general case for the value of dissent in all aspects of decisionmaking in a recent book. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT 210-11 (2006)
(“Organizations and nations are far more likely to prosper if they welcome dissent and promote
openness.”).
11
Brennan Jr, supra note 9 at 438 (“Through dynamic interaction among members of the present
Court and through dialogue across time with the future Court, we ensure the continuing contemporary
relevance and hence vitality of the principles of our fundamental charter.”).
12
CHARLES EVANS HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNTIED STATES 67-68 (1928).
9
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If we believe this and we want to understand the practice of dissent, then we must ask
what is it about the times in question that leads to this result. If true, we might also
think that Chief Justice Roberts’s proposal is wrongheaded, since it would be trying to
fit the square peg of unanimity into the round hole of modern cases and controversies.
This paper argues that there is no abstract answer to the question of how courts
should decide cases or deliver opinions. Issuing majority and dissenting opinions is not
a natural condition or even the most effective, efficient, or rational system for making
law. Moreover, the elimination of dissents would not move the Court in the direction of
a more efficient or perfected state of discourse. Instead, the style of appellate discourse
reflects the power-accumulating tendencies of courts and the law generally. There is in
fact no neutrally efficient answer to the question of how courts should communicate the
results of cases and controversies with litigants, the bar, and the public at large. Style
reflects power, and the Court’s choice of style is about the Court’s power.
This is not a new idea in philosophy: Michel Foucault and others tell us that truth
is not determined in a vacuum, but rather is revealed only through an exercise of
power.13 So too here. The Court has no army, no guns, no bureaucrats to enforce its will,
so its power must come from somewhere else.14 We must find this source of power in the
only place where the Court communicates with those on the outside—its opinions.15 The
content of opinions is obviously an essential element of this power, but this paper argues
that so is the style or manner in which they are issued. And since decisions are an
exercise of power, we should expect the manner in which the Court communicates
decisions to reflect the Court’s power.16 In other words, the presence or absence of
separate opinions does not arise from a state of nature, but depends on the particular
goals or objectives of the Court.17
To test this hypothesis, this paper briefly examines the history of dissent.18 It
shows that the manner in which appellate law is made has been changed several times
throughout Anglo-American legal history in an attempt to increase the power of law
courts over other forms of dispute resolution. The Supreme Court, and its predecessors
in England, sometimes issued dissents and sometimes spoke largely with one voice. In
13

Here I draw on Foucault’s “power/knowledge” dynamic. See MICHEL FOUCAULT
POWER/KNOWLEDGE: SELECTED INTERVIEWS AND OTHER WRITINGS, 1972-1977 (1980) [hereinafter
POWER/KNOWLEDGE ].
14
HAND supra note 4.
15
The power of the Supreme Court manifests itself in many forms, including in structural prestige
and the reputation of individual justices, but is expressed through only one form: the written legal
opinion.
16
As is the case for automobiles, architecture, toothbrushes, and most other things in life, for legal
opinions, form follows function. Architect Louis Sullivan of the Chicago School made the phrase “form
follows function” famous by christening a new style of architecture for sky scrapers that emphasized
exposing the structural realities of buildings instead of hiding them behind adornments. See Louis
Sullivan, The Tall Office Building Artistically Considered, LIPPINCOTT'S MAGAZINE, Mar. 1896.
17
This raises the obvious question of how we can speak of the goals and objectives of “the Court”
when it is composed of individuals and when we normally don’t think of multi-member bodies in this way.
The idea here is that the Court is just a proxy for the overall sociological and subconscious forces at work.
18
Foucault would call this a “genealogical” study of dissent. Genealogy is the process of looking to
the past for an explanation or greater understanding or appreciation of the present. By looking at the
reasons (underlying or overt) dissent is encouraged, tolerated, or squashed at a given time by courts,
genealogy may provide us with the perspective to call the conventional wisdom about dissent into
question.
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each case, the choice about which style was used was made with an eye toward bringing
more business or more interesting business or more influential business to the court. A
specific change in the delivery of opinions designed to achieve precisely this purpose—
increasing the power of “Law”—has happened at least three times on a grand scale: (1)
the change from traditional seriatim opinions to an “opinion of the court” in England
circa 1760; (2) a similar change in the United States Supreme Court upon the
ascendancy of John Marshall to Chief Justice in 1801; and (3) the development of a
tradition of writing separately during the New Deal era of the Supreme Court, which has
persisted to the present.19 In each of these examples, the change of discourse was a pure
power-play designed to increase the role of law in shaping the norms of society.
England’s abandonment of seriatim opinions was designed to increase the reach of law
into the regulation of commercial activity; the Supreme Court’s similar change in the era
of Marshall was intended to increase the role of the Court generally and to assert the
judiciary as an equivalent branch in the fledgling days of American democracy; and the
rise of dissent in the Court was necessary to expand the influence of the Court and Law
in deciding disputes previously or possibly addressed by other, extra-judicial means.
Those seeking to control “truth” in each case, used a change in discourse to
achieve power within their society for themselves, their class, or their group.20 For
example, as shown below, the current practice of issuing frequent dissenting opinions in
the Supreme Court flourishes in order for the Court to legitimately exercise dominion
over controversial social or political disputes, such as reproductive rights, racial
equality, and public safety, that otherwise might be handled by extrajudicial means.
Imagine the potential political reaction to a unanimous and anonymous opinion on the
abortion issue, and one gets an idea of how important dissent is at keeping controversial
issues on the Court’s docket. In other words, dissent is merely one of the tools that allow
the Supreme Court to stay in the business it is in or to extend its power into new areas.21
This does not necessarily mean that there were explicit or even conscious plans by those
making the change. The Court and the individual justices did not plan or necessarily
intend the consequence, but it may be the result of sociological forces beyond their ken.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II explores the relation between
discourse and power, and how this impacts our conceptions of truth. The goal is to put
the opinion delivery practices of the Supreme Court in the context of its larger role in
formulating the legal framework through which truth in our society is determined.
19

The evolution of appellate discourse may be roughly analogous to the theory of “punctuated
equilibrium” in evolutionary biology. See Niles Eldredge & Stephen Jay Gould, Punctuated equilibria: an
alternative to phyletic gradualism, in T.J.M. SCHOPF, ED., MODELS IN PALEOBIOLOGY, 82-115 (1985).
Changes in style, tone, approach, length, etc. occur gradually over the years, and then there is a sudden
change precipitates a dramatic reordering of the predominate discourse. In this view, the changes of
Mansfield and Marshall were the legal equivalents of the asteroids that destroyed the dinosaurs and the
trilobites. The theory has been applied in the public policy context. See Frank Baumgartner, et al., The
Destruction of Issue Monopolies in Congress. 87 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 673 (1993) (showing that government
policies in some areas are characterized by long periods of stability, and are disrupted occasional but rare
shocks).
20
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN L AW 29 (2d ed. 1985) (“In modern times, law
is an instrument; the people in power use it to push or pull toward some definite goal.”).
21
Id. at 18 (“If the courts . . . are hidebound and ineffective, that merely means some other agency
has taken over what courts might otherwise do.”); id. at 114 (“[L]aw had to suit the needs of its
customers.”).
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Section III builds on this foundation by examining the Anglo-American history of
dissenting opinions. The takeaway here is that dissent and unanimity norms are merely
tools that are used to increase the power of the Court and law in general in our society.
Section IV describes current opinion delivery practices, focusing on the change from the
Rehnquist to Roberts Court. In light of the case made in Section III, Roberts’s desire to
move the Court toward unanimity might be seen as a countermove in this historical
vector of more power for courts and law. His discursive move, which doesn’t appear to
be working, is also about the Court’s power, but it may be about decreasing the Court’s
power. Although somewhat unique in the history of the Court, his attempt to
deemphasize the Court’s role in social disputes appears to be consistent with his
jurisprudential philosophy. Here again, we see that discourse is power, whether for
greater or lesser. Section V concludes.
II.

Discourse, Power & Truth

Law is to a great extent what judges say it is,22 and how they say it, is one of the
primary sources of legal power over society. In our society law is often synonymous with
power, and it greatly influences the pursuit of “truth”.23 Not only do laws define the
locus of acceptable conduct within society, but they also set the framework in which
truth is determined. Whether it is the veracity of a litigant’s claim at a trial or the
possible impact of a business merger on consumer well being, law establishes the rules
whereby competing claims of truth are weighed. This was not always the case. In other
societies, at other times, various forms of truth existed outside or above the law.
Religion or magic often was the source.24 Law has displaced these forces so that “the
characteristic of our Western societies [is] that the language of power is law.” 25
But the law does much more than this. Law constructs much of modern
discourse, since it authorizes some to speak and some views to be taken seriously, while
others are marginalized, derided, excluded, or even prohibited. The law creates
discourse that affects all citizens through the creation of “episteme”—historically
enduring discursive regularities that act as perception grids within which thought,
communication, and action can occur. These take the form of much more than enabling
other state or individual actions. For example, court rules, the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, the Federal Rules of Evidence, and the delivery of opinions are all legal
“grids” within which truth is produced. In other words, discourses generate truth.
Foucault writes that:
22

H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF L AW 138 (1961) (“A supreme tribunal has the last word in saying
what the law is and, when it has said it, the statement that the court was ‘wrong’ has no consequences
within the system: no one's rights or duties are thereby altered.”).
23
Here we see the intuition of Max Weber, whose famous speech to Munich University students,
Politics as a Vocation, introduced the concept that the state has a monopoly on the legitimate use of
physical violence. See DANIEL WARNER, A N ETHIC OF RESPONSIBILITY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 9-10
(1991).
24
It is well known that religious or pseudo-religious entities have historically been rivals of law.
See, e.g., F RIEDMAN, supra note 20 at 52, 65 (“[C]hurches . . . worked . . . as rivals of courts.”). In England,
this tradition survived well into the 19th Century, and it is arguably still true in some advanced nations,
and definitely true in other societies. See id. at 202 (“In England [in the 1800’s], ecclesiastical courts had
jurisdiction over marriage and divorce, and the church had an important role in family law.”).
25
FOUCAULT, supra note 13 at 201.
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Each society has its regime of truth, its ‘general politics’ of
truth: that is, the type of discourse which it accepts and
makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which
enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the
means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and
procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the
status of those who are charged with saying what counts as
true.26
Law is the “general politics” of the modern era, and legal opinions are the fundamental
discourse of this politics. Initially, individual lower courts and judges establish the rules
for how the truth will be determined in a particular case. Then appellate courts act as an
additional guardian of a particular form of truth by acting as a normalizing influence
over the lower courts. Lower courts may act in a variety of ways, but appellate courts
supervise this conduct and issue opinions primarily to normalize the conduct of lower
courts. In turn, the Supreme Court fills this same normalization role vis-à-vis the
appellate courts. Whereas lower courts may develop various rules and procedures if left
alone, with appellate supervision the result is the creation of a more regularized and
more legalized form of truth.27
Appellate judges determine the boundaries of what is proper and improper for
individuals in particular cases, for lower courts, and for the practice of law in general.28
This legal grid is not usually transparent or obvious to the lay public, but nevertheless, it
is the locus of acceptable legal behavior within which society is required to function.
Things or actions inside this set of behaviors are accepted as true and proper, while
those outside are punished. This is true not only for specific legal rules (for example,
briefs submitted within a set period of days are accepted, those outside are not), but also
for our society more broadly (for example, burning a flag is protected “speech,” while
burning a cross is generally not).29 In other words, judges—and especially appellate

26

Id. at 131.
This concept of “truth” is divergent from any conventional definition. Historically the word
“truth” was synonymous with “fact” or “actuality.” In this traditional world, truth is neutral and reveals
itself only when the corrupting forces of power are absent. Perhaps this understanding of truth explains
why for most of Anglo-American history legal judgments were made in public, openly and
extemporaneously by each judge, where there was no possibility of “backroom dealing.” This type of
discourse was used under the guise of trying to avoid (or show) the influence or coercion of power. But
truth cannot exist independently of power. In the police station, the courtroom, the state house, the
workplace, and throughout modern society, law is the power that enables the production of knowledge
and the determination of truth.
28
The law does more than allow truth to be revealed in a certain way. Law is one of the most
powerful discourses in that it claims not only to reveal the truth, like science, but also to consecrate it as
the Law, the sole source of legitimate physical power. In this context, an appellate opinion is a source of
truth and a representation of power, not so much as an evaluation of the “facts” of a particular case, but
rather what “facts” are acceptable within the legal grid that the court creates. It is up to the lower courts to
determine the truth, but the appellate court enables the truth to be discovered in a particular way.
29
This is not exactly correct. Burning a cross and burning a flag are both protected to some extent;
what differentiates the treatment of these two acts of speech is the existence of threat in the former case.
Cross burning can be prohibited only when it is a threat. In theory, the state could prohibit flag burning if
27
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judges—determine what is normal and what is abnormal in our society in subjects
ranging far beyond the narrow world of the courtroom. In this way, law is a normalizing
force and a judicial opinion is a normalizing act.30
Appellate opinions achieve this role of normalization in several ways. First and
foremost, the opinion seals the fate of the parties before the court and establishes a
precedent for other individual actors in future cases. In addition, the opinion delineates
the bounds of acceptable reasoning for lower courts. This control is exercised not only
over the final decision of a lesser court, but also over details of procedure, including
what evidence may be admitted, what witnesses may testify, and what judges and juries
may consider as proper in deciding the case. Finally, the opinion will set the broad
boundaries of acceptable legal conduct and argument: law students learn by reading
appellate opinions; lawyers plan cases and strategies by studying appellate opinions;
and judges decide law by following the precedent or argument of previous appellate
opinions. The content, the structure, and the tone of judicial opinions influence all these
players in the practice of law. In other words, a court determines the scope of its own
authority through its discourse.
This discourse among litigants, judges, lawyers, academics, students, and the
public is greatly influenced by the manner in which appellate opinions are issued. The
greatest influence on this discourse is the presence or absence of separate opinions from
the official decision issued by the court as a whole. There are many ways of deciding and
announcing the result of a legal dispute: there could be a collection of opinions from
each judge without an opinion of the court as a whole (seriatim opinions, as was the
tradition in England for hundreds of years); there could be a single unsigned opinion
with no permitted dissent (unanimous, per curiam opinions issued without a public
vote, as is the current practice in civil law countries such as Germany and France)31; or
there could be an opinion of a majority of the judges (either signed or unsigned) along
with any concurring or dissenting opinions (as is primarily the practice in American
federal and state courts).32
The structure of appellate opinions is an integral part of the creation of legal truth
grids. A unanimous opinion (9-0) by the Supreme Court will foster a much different
reaction than a 5-4 decision with several scathing dissents. Unanimous opinions will
settle the law. Although lower courts may try to carve out small areas of disagreement
within the legal grid, the message of the Court is that this issue is decided absolutely and
will not be subject to reconsideration any time soon. No foreseeable changes in Court
personnel or attitude are likely to change the votes of five justices. By contrast an
opinion that carries the vote by only one justice will send quite a different message to
lower courts and to lawyers who may wish to challenge the precedent. Challenges will be
fruitful when changes in Court membership make the vote uncertain or when a
it was viewed as a threat, but this is much more difficult to imagine. The end result in most cases will be
that burning a flag is OK, while burning a cross is not.
30
See MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH 187-92 (1975) (using hospitals as a prototypical
example of the growth of normalization through record keeping and other forms of documentary power).
31
Continental law (and the law in Japan, China, and other non-Anglo-American countries) is not
made by judges but is contained mostly in written statutory codes. In the common law system, in contrast,
a great deal of law is made by the opinions of judges. FRIEDMAN, supra note 20 at 22.
32
For an analysis of the difference between these styles, see Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial
Voice, supra note 9 at 67; Ginsburg, Remarks on Writing Separately, supra note 9 at 133.
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compelling case comes along that may force one or two justices to reconsider their vote.
Therefore, dissenting opinions are more likely to create some uncertainty in the law.
This uncertainty will produce a much different process for determining “truth.”33
The resulting discourse – be it ambiguous, disputed, apparently unassailable, or
obscure – determines, or at least greatly influences, our conception of legal “knowledge”
and the determination of legal “truth.” As a result, this apparently simple feature of
appellate opinions can in actuality shape the very foundations of a society. Throughout
history the process of deciding cases, of establishing how the “truth” will be determined,
has changed, and with it the legal discourse has changed. Seriatim opinions were
common at certain times and in certain nations, while unanimous opinions dominated
at other times or in certain countries or legal systems. But what determines the shape of
appellate discourse and why do we see different types of discourse at different times and
across different societies?
III.

A Brief History of Dissent

There are only three widely used ways in which multi-judge courts have delivered
judicial decisions over nearly a thousand of years of recorded Anglo-American
jurisprudence. The first is the seriatim delivery of the judgment of each judge
individually and one after another with the grounds for the decision (known as
“seratim”). This practice prevailed in Great Britain for nearly all of its history, from the
time of William the Conqueror to present day. It also was common in U.S. courts (both
state and federal) at the Founding. The second is delivering an “opinion of the court” as
a whole, with no publicly revealed vote or separate opinions issued by individual judges.
This practice has been used at least two times, by chief judges Lord Mansfield of the
King’s Bench in England and (more or less) John Marshall of the United States Supreme
Court. Finally, the modern practice in the United States is a hybrid, in which an opinion
of a majority of the court is issued, but judges decide individually whether to “write
separately”. This section traces the historical development of these three models briefly
to search for explanations for their use.
A. The English Experience
From almost a thousand years, decisions of multi-member courts in England
were delivered orally by each judge seriatim and without any prior intra-court
consultation.34 The opinions, the sum of which would amount to the legal rule in the
case, were not even published by the court or the judges until the early Seventeenth
Century. Prior to that time, case reports were compiled by “prothonotaries” or scribes,35
who recorded, to the best of their ability, the proceedings of the court and the orally
delivered opinions of the judges. These reports, covering a continuous period from the
reigns of King Edward I to Henry VIII (1268 to 1535), were originally published in raw
form, and were used by lawyers as source material and precedent. The unedited and
33

This analysis is true, of course, only in a legal system in which judges express their differences
in public through concurring and dissenting opinions. In France and Germany, all opinions carry the
same discursive impact because disagreement is not published.
34
See, e.g., WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT 40 (2d ed. 2001).
35
In some accounts, scribes were law students, and the recordation process was their education.
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unabridged compilations were massive and in no sense portrayed a coherent picture of
the law. Lawyers and judges had a difficult time even figuring out what the legal rule
from a case was.36 “Precedent” was virtually unknown, since it implies the existence of a
stable of judgments available to parties and judges. Abridgements of leading cases
appeared by the late Fifteenth Century,37 but the quality varied tremendously, and no
official court reports were issued until Edward Coke published his cases in 1609.38 The
“poverty of the law reports,” as C.H.S. Fifoot writes, contributed to the lack of clarity of
the law.39 This had many bad effects, but, as shown below, the lack of clarity did not
become a crisis until the rise of commerce in the mid-Seventeenth Century.
Even after Coke and his contemporaries formulated the issuance of official
reports of judicial decisions, the practice of each judge delivering his opinion seriatim
continued. Although undoubtedly tradition and a sense of its efficiency sustained this
practice, we can only speculate as to its origins. One possibility is concern about
concealed power. Oral delivery by each individual judge may be a more accountable
method of deciding cases than decisions made in seclusion, since judgments made in the
open and without prior discussion may be less likely to be (or appear to be) infected by
corruption or collusion or the influence of the monarch. As critics complained after
certain American courts departed from the seriatim tradition, forcing individual judges
to give their account provided a basis to hold judges accountable, which in turn gave
them an incentive to work hard and do well.40
The long and unbroken tradition of delivering opinions seriatim was changed
unilaterally with the ascendancy of William Murray, known as “Lord Mansfield”, to the
position of Lord Chief Justice of the King’s Bench in 1756.41 Mansfield introduced a
procedure for generating agreement and consensus among judges and then issuing
36

William Murray, who practiced before the Court of Chancery in the mid-Eighteenth Century
(when reporting was still poor in equity courts), wrote: “It is a misfortune attending a court of equity, that
the cases are generally taken in loose notes, and sometimes by persons who do not understand business,
and very often draw general principles from a case, without attending to particular circumstances, which
weighed with the court in the determination of these cases.” JAMES OLDHAM , ENGLISH COMMON L AW IN THE
AGE OF MANSFIELD 366 (2004).
37
The first abridgment was made by Nicholas Statham, Baron of the Exchequer under Edward IV,
in around 1470. 8 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF ENGLISH AND AMERICAN LITERATURE, Chapter XIII sec. 9,
(1907) (“As the number of the Year Books increased, it became convenient to make classified abridgments
of their leading cases. The first of these was made, about 1470, by Nicholas Statham, baron of the
exchequer under Edward IV.”).
38
Edward Coke, who served as Chief Justice of the Court of Common Pleas and then the King’s
Bench, became the first English jurist to publish his opinions in 1609. His cases became Volume I of the
English Reports.
39
See CECIL H.S. FIFOOT, LORD MANSFIELD 89 (1936).
40
See infra notes 93-109 and surrounding text. Thomas Jefferson, a strong critic of the “opinion
of the court”, wrote: “An opinion is huddled up in conclave, perhaps by a majority of one, delivered as if
unanimous, and with the silent acquiescence of lazy or timid associates, by a crafty chief judge, who
sophisticates the law to his own mind, by the turn of his own reasoning.” Letter from Thomas Jefferson to
Thomas Ritchie (Dec. 25, 1820), in 10 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 169, 171 (Paul L. Ford ed.,
1899).
41
Murray served as Lord Chief Justice from 1756 to 1788. The King’s Bench was one of three
common law courts in England at the time. Although there were rival courts of various royal and nonroyal statures, the King’s Bench was the most important common law court in the land. Appeals were
possible but largely unknown, and therefore the King’s Bench had the ultimate say in most matters,
especially those of a commercial nature.
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caucused opinions. The judges met collectively in the secrecy of their chambers, worked
out their differences into a compromise decision, and then wrote what was to be
delivered as an anonymous and unanimous “opinion of the court”. Mansfield made this
dramatic change in an attempt to bring clarity to the law in order to bring English
commercial law in line with prevailing practices in trades and in other countries.42 He
succeeded. Jim Oldham, the world’s leading Mansfield scholar, summarizes his
accomplishment: “[Mansfield] established the basic principles that continue to govern
the mercantile energies of England and America down to the present day.”43
During the Middle Ages and until Mansfield, the law governing business affairs—
known as “the law merchant”—was administered by special lay courts at “fairs” set up on
trade routes, in trade centers, or that traveled across Europe.44 The law merchant was
distinct from the body of common law since it was international in scope and based
largely on trade-specific customs that were unique to the commercial setting. The law
merchant consisted primarily of semi-codified customs that developed over the course
of many years and many thousands of transactions.45 It also existed in various treaties or
legal codes set out by scholars and merchants in trade centers, like Rhodes, Barcelona,
or Visby.46
In many cases, this customary law differed from the more structured formalities
of English common law.47 For example, in certain periods, an action in contract in the
King’s Court was permitted only on a written document “sealed by the party against
whom the claim was made” while in fair courts this rule was generally waived.48 In
general, the customs and practices of trades were the law of commerce on the Continent,
while these were foreign to judges, juries, and judgments in English courts. As Lord
Holt, who preceded Mansfield as chief justice, noted when describing why the “law”
should be insulated from the influence of merchants: “no protagonist, however
42

FRIEDMAN, supra note 20 at 133. Mansfield recognized the importance of the law merchant,
which was based largely on commercial customs in practice in some areas since the Middle Ages, and
incorporated it into general rules of application within the larger common law.
43
OLDHAM, supra note 36 at 10.
44
EDMUND HEWARD, LORD MANSFIELD: A BIOGRAPHY OF WILLIAM MURRAY 1ST EARL OF MANSFIELD
(1705-1793) LORD CHIEF JUSTICE FOR 32 YEARS 99 (Barry Rose 1979); FRIEDMAN, supra note 20 at 28
(“There were many types of merchant courts, including the colorful courts of piepowder, a court of the
fairs where merchants gathered.”).
45
For a modern example, see Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry:
Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724 (2001) (describing
the private commercial law used by merchants in the cotton industry).
46
In the famous case, Luke v. Lyde, Lord Mansfield cited to various laws of the sea, including
Rhodian Laws, the Consolato del Mere (Barcelona), and the laws of Visby. See Bridget Murphy, Luke v.
Lyde, 2003 AUCKLAND UNIV. L. REV. 2 (2003).
47
Edward Coke, who preceded Lord Mansfield on the King’s Bench by 150 years, declared in 1608
that “the Law Merchant is part of this realm”, see 1 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
182a (1648), but this did not mean that customary commercial law was fully incorporated into the
common law or that common law courts stepped aside and let merchant courts settle disputes. A century
and a half after Coke made this statement, the common law was largely ignorant and disrespectful of the
Law Merchant. See W.S. Holdsworth, The Rules of Venue, and the Beginnings of the Commercial
Jurisdiction of the Common Law Courts, 7 COLUM . L. REV. 551, 561-62 (1914) (“It was not till the common
law obtained in Lord Mansfield a judge who was a master of [foreign writings on commercial customs]
that the rules deducible from the many various commercial customs which had come before the courts
were formed into a coherent system, and completely incorporated with the common law.”).
48
See HEWARD, supra note 44 at 100-01.
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influential, [should] be permitted to dictate the terms upon which his dispute should be
resolved.”49 In this respect, England differed substantially from the continent of Europe,
where trade guild law was well incorporated into the body of general law.50 As could be
expected, this procedural difference made law courts less valuable for resolving
commercial disputes.
The unprecedented growth in trade and commerce during the Eighteenth
Century made the usefulness of courts in settling commercial law disputes an especially
acute problem. In the fifty years before Mansfield became chief justice and for the fifty
years after, international commerce became essential to the success of England’s
expanding empire.51 As Dr. Samuel Johnson noted in 1756, the same year Mansfield was
called to the bench, “there was never from the earliest ages a time in which trade so
much engaged the attention of mankind, or commercial gain was sought with such
general emulation.”52 At this time “the place of the Law Merchant in English law was
considerably unsettled . . . [because] very few general rules and principles had been
established to which isolated decisions could be adjusted.”53 English courts were not
viewed as being equipped to offer a valuable service to commercial parties. The
inadequacy of common law courts is apparent from commentary by merchants at the
time. One influential guide for merchants noted that “[t[he right dealing merchant doth
not care how little he hath to do in the Common Law.”54 Others advocated the
establishment of specialty courts, impugning the law courts for not understanding
commercial issues and creating confusion with their opinions.55
The divergence between formal and informal law, between common and
commercial law, was a problem for law courts since their inadequacy simply pushed
commercial disputes to other types of or forums for dispute resolution. Courts were,
from the perspective of business interests, overly formal and out of touch with the
reality of commerce. The growth of commercial transactions in number, size, and
complexity also exacerbated the problem.56 As commerce became more demanding of
law, the hodgepodge of courts (e.g., courts of law, courts of equity, law merchant courts,
ecclesiastical courts, etc.) regulating commerce only added to the misfit between
common law adjudication and the needs of business. This manifested itself in two ways.
49

FIFOOT, supra note 39 at 9.
See HEWARD, supra note 44 at 99-101.
51
See P. MARSHALL, THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY (1988) 53 (noting during the period 1697 to 1815
exports increased much faster than population growth or economic growth as a whole).
52
See FIFOOT, supra note 39 at 4.
53
MURPHY, supra note 46 at 4.
54
JOHN MARIUS, ADVICE CONCERNING BILLS OF EXCHANGE (Early English books On-line, Electronic
Reproduction Ann Arbor, Michigan 1999).
55
JOHN D. CARY, AN ESSAY ON THE STATE OF ENGLAND IN RELATION TO ITS TRADE (Printed by W
Bonny 1695, Early English books On-line, Electronic Reproduction Ann Arbor, Michigan 1999)
(advocating “Courts of Merchants... for the speedy deciding all differences relating to Sea Affairs, which
are better ended by those who understand them, than they are in Westminster-Hall.”); see also JOSIAH
CHILD, A DISCOURSE ABOUT TRADE (Printed by A Sowle 1689, Early English books On-line, Electronic
Reproduction Ann Arbor, Michigan 1999) (“it is well if, after great expenses of time and money, we can
make our own Counsel (being Common Lawyers) understand one half of our Case, we being amongst
them as in a Foreign Country.”).
56 For example, during the time when Lord Mansfield was Chief Justice the number of cases
involving promissory notes or bills of exchange increased about 100 percent per year, over three times the
increase in cases overall. HEWARD, supra note 44 at 53.
50

11

12 / Henderson
First, different courts made different rules, creating uncertainty for businesses.
There were over 70 law “courts” operating in London in the late Eighteenth Century,
and these were administered by almost 800 judges.57 Although this plethora of courts
gave plaintiffs a wide range of options to find the best venue for their claim, the lack of a
centralized or systematic reporting system made the mishmash of courts a nightmare
for anyone looking for certain legal rules. Even with a modern database like Westlaw,
English judges and litigants at the time would have had difficulty determining the rule
for any particular case. The plight of businessmen planning their affairs without legal
counsel would have been nearly hopeless.
Even when we narrow the number of courts down to the most important ones,58
this still leaves three—Common Pleas, Exchequer, and Kings’ Bench—all of which had
overlapping jurisdiction.59 Decisions from these courts were not binding authority on
other courts,60 meaning there were (at least) three relevant sources of legal precedents
for any particular dispute. According to Oldham, “[t]he horizontal structure of the
English general courts, with three common law courts, each court operating largely
independently of the others, inhibited growth of the notion of binding precedent.”61 In
addition, separate equity courts, specifically the Court of Chancery, existed as an
alternative to law courts. Although these had limited jurisdiction, they were available for
many commercial law disputes. To complicate matters, equity courts typically had even
worse reporting than the law courts.62
It is not surprising that these many courts competed with each other for business.
They did so not only for the reputational benefits, but for cash, since judges were paid by
the case.63 According to a recent study, the judges therefore had an incentive to rule in
favor of plaintiffs, since they were the party that chose the venue in most common law
cases.64 Plaintiffs also had an incentive to choose a venue that increased their prospects,
See PATRICK COLQUHOUN, A TREATISE ON THE POLICE OF THE METROPOLIS 383-88 (5th ed.)
(describing 9 supreme courts, 4 ecclesiastical courts, 17 courts for the City of London, 8 courts for the City
of Westminster, 14 courts for the part of the city lying in County of Middlesex, 8 courts in the Borough of
Southwark, 18 courts for small debts, one court of oyer and terminer, 4 courts of general and quarter
sessions of the peace, 10 courts for the police petty matters, and 5 corners’ courts. These were overseen by
753 judges. Id. at 389. This does not include the innumerable merchants’ courts, private arbitration
proceedings, and other methods for resolving disputes.
58 These three courts were the primary source of the Common Law during this period, despite
being responsible for only a small percentage of cases. See OLDHAM, supra note 36 at 12.
59 These courts, comprised of four judges each, had overlapping jurisdiction, and therefore
competed for cases. As Daniel Klerman argues in a recent paper, competition was fierce, since judges were
paid by the case. See Daniel M. Klerman, Jurisdictional Competition and the Evolution of the Common
Law (University of Southern California CLEO Research Paper No. C07-4 , March 2007), available at
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=968701, (forthcoming).
60 OLDHAM, supra note 36 at 366 (“Decisions from another court would be looked to only as
advisory or as a means of persuasion.”).
61 OLDHAM, supra note 36 at 365.
62 William Murray, who practiced before the Court of Chancery in the mid-Eighteenth Century
(when reporting was still poor in equity courts), wrote: “It is a misfortune attending a court of equity, that
the cases are generally taken in loose notes, and sometimes by persons who do not understand business,
and very often draw general principles from a case, without attending to particular circumstances, which
weighed with the court in the determination of these cases.” OLDHAM, supra note 36 at 366.
63 See KLERMAN, supra note 59 at 9-11 (showing that fees paid to judges per case were substantial
and sufficient to bias their decisions in favor of plaintiffs, who chose the venue)
64 Id.
57

A Theory of Dissent / 13
regardless of the impact on future cases, which could be brought in other courts. If a
business wanted to enforce a contract without a sealed, written document, it could bring
an action at a merchant fair instead filing a formal pleading with a law court. And if a
business had an equitable action to bring—that a contract should be enforced despite
technical defects for example—it would have to do so in Chancery, where this argument
was allowed, as opposed to the law courts. In this way, the various “courts” of England at
that time competed for the business of commercial dispute resolution. By making
favorable rules or procedures, courts could attract more disputes to resolve (taking
market share from competing courts) and perhaps encourage more suits due to reduced
transaction costs (growing the pie).
Second, even within a specific court jurisdiction, the use of seriatim opinions
added a layer of unnecessary confusion to the opinions of that court. Instead of a binary
win-loss character, opinions at the time were a collection of “for” and “against”
arguments. To determine whether one had won or lost a case, and, more importantly
what the rule of the case was and how strong the precedent was, it was necessary to
count heads who had voted for a particular argument or line of reasoning. In complex
commercial disputes, this was not an easy matter. Moreover, interpreting past cases to
plan future arguments was also exceedingly complex given the plethora of opinions on
every subject, and the often highly nuanced differences among them. Accordingly,
during this period the law became much more “confusing and remote to merchants and
businessmen.”65 Thus the nascent commercial law of England was uncertain, exactly the
opposite of what businesses needed to thrive.
From the perspective of Eighteenth Century merchants what was needed was
someone or something to bring more certainty to commercial dealings, to simplify legal
proceedings and to create a simple set of rules that could be applied to all transactions.66
According to Mansfield, the law of business “ought not to depend on subtleties and
niceties, but upon rules easily learned and easily retained because they are dictates of
common sense . . ..” 67
From the perspective of courts what was needed was a way to bring the business
of commercial regulation from other courts or bodies to law courts – i.e., to increase the
market share that law courts had for commercial disputes.68 Mansfield’s strategy was to
make the decisions of his court (i.e., his product) more attractive to potential litigants
(i.e., potential customers). To do this, Mansfield adopted the best practices of
competitors. He created a set of general principles based on the valuable services that
rival courts offered business litigants. These general principles included the requirement
of good faith (from equitable courts) and the use of trade custom (from the law
merchant or fair courts). Mansfield believed that the international nature of commerce

FRIEDMAN, supra note 20 at 95.
FRIEDMAN, supra note 20 at 58 (“The merchant’s idea of a good legal system was one that was
rational and efficient, conforming to his values and expectations – traits that neither lay justice neither
the baroque extravagances of English procedure [at law courts] supplied.”).
67 Hamilton v. Mendes, 2 Burr. 1214 (1761).
68 FRIEDMAN, supra note 20 at 18. Mansfield wanted not only to take cases from other courts, but
also from the legislature. See JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF
THE CONSTITUTION 211 (1997) (describing Mansfield as engaged in a “project of defending . . . traditional
modes of adjudication against the perceived vices of legislation.”).
65

66
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meant that commercial law must be the “same all over the world”69 and that this meant
England had to move its formal law in the direction of traditional practices in other
countries. “He . . . encouraged the development of legal rules that would support a
commercial economy that was increasingly dependent on paper credit and that was
vigorously involved in international trade.”70 Related to this was his view that legal rules
should be understood by those “who must obey [them]”.71 The normative underpinning
of Mansfield’s revolution was certainty: “the great object in every branch of law, but
especially in mercantile law, is certainty.”72
But Mansfield needed a mechanism to deliver certainty. He found it in the
“opinion of the court.” The reform of the common law of commerce was possible only
with an assertion of judicial power through a united court speaking in a single voice. No
longer would multiple courts and numerous judges produce different opinions subject to
nuance and ambiguity. A single court would hear and decide the fundamental issues of
commercial law; decide them once and for all without dispute or ambiguity, and provide
the certainty and stability needed for commercial transactions.73 The new “truth” about
commercial law could only be discovered by an exercise of power – the power to change
the discourse of the law, to change the form to adapt to the new function.
Mansfield’s success can be measured in several ways. For one, as a result of his
legal innovations, Mansfield’s court flourished. Prior to Mansfield’s discursive change,
very few commercial cases came before law courts such as the King’s Bench.74 As a result
of the consolidation of power through the focusing of legal discourse, Mansfield created
a forum that was conducive to handling commercial cases, and “business flowed into his
court.”75
The number of “commercial cases” handled by the King’s Bench increased more
rapidly than the overall growth rate of the docket as a whole. For example, the number
of commercial cases handled by the King’s Bench grew by 30 percentage points more
than all other cases during Mansfield’s time on the bench.76 More specifically, the
number of cases involving promissory notes, which are essential elements for
international trade rose five fold from about 3 per year during the beginning of
Mansfield’s tenure to about 15 per year at the end. Cases involving “bills of exchange”
Pelly v. Royal Exchange Assurance Co., 1 Burr. 341, 347 (1757).
OLDHAM, supra note 36 at 365.
71 Id. at 124.
72 Milles v. Fletcher, 1 Doug. 231, 232 (1779).
73 Mansfield’s application of equitable principles to commercial disputes was extremely
controversial. In fact, Mansfield’s successors – such as Kenyon, Thurlow, and Eldon – all opposed this
reform, and it was not until 1873 that the Supreme Court of Judicature was established and endowed with
both equitable and legal powers. See Judicature Act of 1873, § 24.
74 FIFOOT, supra note 39 at 13 n.1.
75 HEWARD, supra note 44 at 173. Other factors contributed to the success of the King’s Bench at
attracting cases to the court. Mansfield was a very hard worker and, by all accounts, operated his court
with a ruthless efficiency. See OLDHAM, supra note 36 at 5 (“H]e took particular care that this should not
create delay or expense to the parties; and therefore he always dictated the case to the Court, and saw it
signed by counsel, before another clause was called; and always made it a condition in the rule, “that it
should be set down to be argued within the first four days of the term.”).
76 According to Heward, the number of commercial cases (e.g., “goods sold and delivered”,
“money”, “promissory notes”, “policy of assurance”, and “bills of exchange”) grew 105 percent, from 217
during the period 1761-1765 to 444 during the period 1776-1780, where as the total number of other cases
grew from 75 percent (134 to 235) over the same periods. See HEWARD, supra note 44, at 105-06.
69
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and various monetary disputes saw similar increases, while common law standards, like
trover and trespass increased at much lower rates.77
Another measure of Mansfield’s success is his impact on legal thinkers and legal
aggregators of the day. Blackstone, the greatest of these, wrote, just nine years after
Mansfield became chief justice, that “the learning relating to . . . insurance[] hath of late
years been greatly improved by a series of judicial decisions, which have now established
the law.” 78 Judge Buller, writing seven years after Mansfield stepped down, described
the impact:
Before [Mansfield] we find that in Courts of law all the evidence in mercantile
cases was thrown together . . . and they produced no established principle. From
that time we all know the great study has been to find some certain general
principles...not only to rule the particular case then under consideration, but to
serve as a guide for the future.79
Writing with a bit more historical perspective, Oldham writes that Mansfield was
one of the two “most important judicial figures in the law of bankruptcy”80, and the
elucidator of the fundamental legal principles of insurance and negotiable instruments,
where his chief contribution was “cogency”.81 Mansfield brought, “with considerable
success”, merchant customs “harmoniously” into the common law.82 Mansfield
accomplished the reform of commercial law—in fact, the capture of commercial
regulation by law—in part through an alternation of legal discourse.83 Clarity, which
commerce demanded as a precondition for using law courts, was achieved by changing
opinion delivery practices in a way designed to unify the judicial voice.
But the change from seriatim opinions to opinions of the court was short-lived.
On the retirement of Mansfield, Lord Kenyon put an end to the practice, and the judges
returned to the practice of seriatim opinions.84 This tradition preserved until very
recently in all multimember English courts.85
B. Early American Practices

Trover, or an action for the taking of property, went from 32 to 44, trespass from 7 to 16. See id.
See 2 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England *461.
79 Lickbarrow v Mason, 2 TR 63, 74; 100 ER 35 (1787).
80 OLDHAM, supra note 36 at 107.
81 Id. at 124, 163.
82 Id. at 365, 368.
83 Id. at 365 (“[Mansfield] strove with considerable success to absorb the customs of merchants
into the common law.”).
84 Until recently they delivered their opinions seriatim, each Lord reading aloud his judgment and
the reasons for it. The Lords no longer routinely deliver five separate opinions, although they do more
frequently announce separate opinions than our Supreme Court. J. H. BAKER, INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH
LEGAL HISTORY 204-11 (3d ed.) (1990).
85 The Law Lords, who serve as the Supreme Court of Great Britain in some cases, routinely
delivered opinions seriatim, with each of the five judges announcing an individual judgment with reasons.
See LOUIS BLOM-COOPER & GAVIN D REWRY, FINAL APPEAL: A STUDY OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS IN ITS JUDICIAL
CAPACITY 81-82, 523 (1972). This practice recently waned. See also PATERSON, THE LAW LORDS 109-10
(1982) (noting that the Lords no longer routinely deliver five separate opinions).
77
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England’s long tradition of seriatim opinions crossed the Atlantic along with
much of the common law during the formative stages of American judicial
development.86 Early American jurists learned the law by studying the English common
law, and therefore adopted many of its practices and institutions. In addition, many of
the state courts were established before Mansfield’s discursive innovation, so in every
state court and in the early years of the Supreme Court, American judges continued the
practice of seriatim opinions.87
But Mansfield’s change was evident to young American courts and judges, so in
some cases it was emulated. In several states, the practice of Lord Mansfield was
adopted as a way to increase the power of the courts vis-à-vis the other branches of
government. Jurists in these states saw how Mansfield was able to increase the power of
his court at the expense of other forms of power, and were eager to emulate this power
grab. For example, in Virginia soon after the Revolution, Judge Edmund Pendleton
became the chief judge of the court of appeals.88 Pendleton admired Mansfield and
“considered him as the greatest luminary of law that any age had ever produced.”89
Pendleton introduced Mansfield's practice of “making up opinions in secret & delivering
them as the Oracles of the court.” 90
This practice was widely criticized by Thomas Jefferson and other Republicans.
Due to this political pressure, upon the ascension of Judge Spencer Roane to Judge
Pendleton’s seat on the bench some years later, the practice ceased and the tradition of
seriatim opinions was quickly reinstated.91 Roane shared Jefferson’s view about the role
of the judiciary, which is best expressed in a letter he sent to Roane after the decision in
Marbury v. Madison: “The constitution, on this hypothesis, is a mere thing of wax in
the hands of the judiciary, which they may twist, and shape into any form they please.”92
Politics was not yet completely comfortable with judges playing such a powerful role in
policy.
Thomas Jefferson’s role in returning to seriatim opinions in Virginia courts is not
surprising since he was a vocal critic of courts and the threat to democracy an
aggrandizement of judicial power posed.93 This battle against Judge Pendleton in
FRIEDMAN, supra note 20 at 112 (“To fill the gap [in American law at the beginning], English
materials were used, English reports cited, English judges quoted as authority.”).
87 See SERIATIM: THE S UPREME COURT BEFORE JOHN M ARSHALL (Scott D. Gerber ed., 1998); see
also David P. Currie, Review of Seriatim: The Supreme Court Before John Marshall (Scott D. Gerber ed.)
105 AM. HIST. REV. 1301, 1301 (2000) (noting that “the justices of the time deliver[ed] their opinions
seriatim.”).
88 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Justice William Johnson (Oct. 27, 1822), in THOMAS
JEFFERSON: WRITINGS 1460-63 (Merrill D. Peterson, ed., 1984).
89 Id.; Mansfield was a hero to many early colonial lawyers, so it is not surprising that his
experiment with unanimous, anonymous opinions would be something they were willing to try. See
FRIEDMAN, supra note 20 at 109 (“One of the cultural heroes of the American legal elite was England’s
Lord Mansfield.”).
90 Id.
91 See Donald G. Morgan, The Origin of Supreme Court Dissent, 3 WILLIAM & MARY QUART. 353,
354 (1953) (“In Virginia, . . . Judge Pendleton, taking Mansfield as his model, had instituted the secret,
unanimous opinion in the state bench; his successor, Judge Roane, had abolished the practice.”).
92 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Spencer Roane, (Sept. 6, 1819), in THE WORKS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1904—5).
93 See generally RICHARD E. ELLIS, THE JEFFERSONIAN CRISIS: COURTS AND POLITICS IN THE YOUNG
REPUBLIC (1971).
86
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Virginia foreshadowed a battle with John Marshall over the same issue regarding the
way the Supreme Court delivered opinions. In fact, this single issue would become one
of the predominant political issues of the age, embroiling the nation’s legal system for a
decade and threatening the political stability of the young nation.94 The winners of the
battle—Marshall and the Federalists it turns out—would use their victory over the form
of legal discourse to build much of what we recognize as the American legal system. The
Supreme Court and its relation with the other branches of government as we know it
today, looks like it does today because of Marshall’s ability to carry the day with respect
to how legal opinions should be issued from the bench.
Jefferson praised the seriatim system of announcing the law for four reasons: (1)
it increased transparency and led to more accountability; (2) it showed that each judge
had considered and understood the case; (3) it gave more or less weight to a precedent
based on the vote of the judges; (4) and it allowed judges in the future to overrule bad
law based on the reasoning of their predecessors.95 The overarching rationale for
Jefferson’s preference was to limit what he viewed as the undemocratic power of courts.
First, Jefferson argued for a return to seriatim opinions to increase the
transparency of the decision making process in order to reign in the power of the
judiciary. In Jefferson’s view, the practice of issuing an “opinion of the court” insulated
any single justice from criticism. In this way, “judicia[l] perversions of the Constitution
will forever be protected.” 96 Opinions of the court were the shield that insulated the
justices from obloquy and perhaps even impeachment. Jefferson described the practice
of issuing opinions as an entire court without a public vote as a “most condemnable”
practice in which the justices “cook[ed] up a decision in caucus and deliver[ed] it by one
of their members as the opinion of the court, without the possibility of our knowing how
many, who, and for what reasons each member concurred.”97 In Jefferson’s opinion it
was not only the particular decisions that were to be condemned but also the process
which “smother[ed] evidence” and allowed the justices to decide important questions
without “justify[ing] the reasons which led to their opinion.”98
Second, Jefferson worried that judges were lazy, aloof, or otherwise absent from
decision making on important legal questions. Jefferson reasoned that requiring a judge
to write out his argument for each case would provide sufficient incentive for each judge
to adequately consider the legal merits of the case. Jefferson wrote:
Let [each judge] prove by his reasoning that he has read the
papers, that he has considered the case, that in the
application of the law to it, he uses his own judgment
94 See generally JAMES F. SIMON, WHAT KIND OF NATION: THOMAS JEFFERSON, JOHN M ARSHALL ,
AND THE EPIC STRUGGLE TO CREATE A U NITED STATES (2003). Jefferson and Marshall battled repeatedly

over the extent of judicial power in the early Republic. See, e.g., id. at 285 (noting that Jefferson criticized
Marshall’s opinion in Cohens v. Virginia, writing to Judge Spencer Roane: “The great object of my fear is
the federal judiciary. . . . Let the eye of vigilance never be closed.”).
95 In this final capacity, dissenting opinions act as an “antiprecedent” that allows future judges to
base their decision to overrule the previous opinion based on established legal reasoning.
96 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Pleasants (December 1821), in 10 THE W RITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 198-99 (Paul Leicester Ford, ed., 1892-99).
97 Id.
98 Id.
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independently and unbiased by party views and personal
favor or disfavor.99
Third, Jefferson wrote that multiple opinions not only “communicated [the law]
by [the judges] several modes of reasoning, it showed whether the judges were
unanimous or divided, and gave accordingly more or less weight to the judgment as a
precedent.”100 All Jefferson really wanted was a vote. “Why should not every judge be
asked his opinion, and give it from the bench, if only by yea or nay? . . . it would show
whether the opinions were unanimous or not, and thus settle more exactly the weight of
their authority.” 101
This practice of dissent by vote only was occasionally practiced in the early years
of the Court102 and has been advocated by some modern commentators.103 To Jefferson,
who was fearful of the aggrandizement of power in the judiciary,104 this would allow the
legislature or other courts to respond appropriately to the decision—follow it, evade it,
or bypass it with legislation or constitutional amendment—based on the “strength” of
the opinion. Dissent, with or without opinion, would serve this function.
Finally, Jefferson acknowledged that temporal communication between current
and future judges allowed for bad law to be overturned more easily.105 Jefferson knew of
English cases in which laws were occasionally overruled based on “dissents” in previous
seriatim opinions. Jefferson acknowledged this when he wrote that “[i]t sometimes
happened too that when there were three opinions against one, the reasoning of the one
was so much the most cogent as to become afterwards the law of the land.”106 This is the
most powerful justification for dissent. In fact, Jefferson was foreshadowing to an extent
the future of the Supreme Court and the power of dissenting opinions when he called for
this sort of deliberation from judge to judge across time. To take just two of the many
examples from Supreme Court history, dissents in cases such as Lochner v. New York107
and Plessy v. Ferguson,108 were instrumental in changing the law many years in the
future.109
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Justice William Johnson (March 4, 1823), in 7 THE WRITINGS
278-79 (Henry A. Washington, ed., 1853-54).
100 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Justice William Johnson (Oct. 27, 1822), in THOMAS
JEFFERSON: WRITINGS 1460-63 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1990).
101 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Justice William Johnson (Jun. 6, 1823), in 7 THE W RITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 99 at 293-98.
102 For example, in Herbert v. Wren, 11 U.S. 370 (1813), Justice Johnson dissented from the
opinion of the Court, but did not state his reasons.
103 RICHARD A. POSNER , THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 174 (1996).
104 Thomas Jefferson strongly disagreed with Alexander Hamilton’s characterization of the
judiciary as the “least dangerous branch.” See THE FEDERALIST 78, 392-399 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999).
105 Of course dissenting opinions can be used to overturn “good” law too.
106 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Justice William Johnson (October 27, 1822) in THOMAS
JEFFERSON: WRITINGS, supra note 100 at 1460-63.
107 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
108 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
109 The overruling of laissez-faire constitutionalism based on Justice Holmes’s dissent in Lochner
was the first time in Supreme Court history that a fundamental jurisprudential doctrine was overruled on
the basis of a prior dissenting opinion. Similarly, it was Justice Harlan’s lone dissent in Plessy that would
99

OF THOMAS JEFFERSON,

A Theory of Dissent / 19
For these reasons perhaps, but more likely out of tradition, the Supreme Court,
like most of the state courts, initially emulated the seriatim practice of their brethren on
England’s highest courts. The fact that decisions of the Supreme Court were issued as a
collection of separate opinions, with each justice issuing an opinion of the case with
reasons for the decision, also limited the Court’s power. Just as in the King’s Bench
before and after Mansfield, this style of opinion delivery created substantial uncertainty
and instability in the law. 110
Calder v. Bull, a classic case from the pre-Marshall Supreme Court, demonstrates
this problem perfectly.111 Decided in 1798, the Court considered whether a statute
passed by the Connecticut legislature overturning a state court probate decision violated
the ex post facto clause of the federal Constitution.112 At least four justices wrote
opinions on the ex post facto issue, and the holding was therefore highly confused. The
modern interpretation of the collection of seriatim opinions is that the constitutional
clause applies only to retroactive punishment, but, according to David Currie, “the
practice of seriatim opinions . . . . make[s] it difficult to say that this was the holding of
the Court . . . .” 113 Currie goes on to conclude that “Calder illustrates the uncertainty that
can arise when each Justice writes separately . . .,”114 and that “[t]he practice of seriatim
opinions . . . . weakened the force of the [Court’s] decisions . . ..”115
The result of this practice was a weak and divided Court unable to assert any real
authority.116 Although the Federalists, including the first chief justice, John Jay, wanted
to assert the Court’s power to ensure the supremacy of federal law, Anti-Federalist
antipathy toward the federal judiciary continued to dominate the political scene.117
The weakness of the Court was demonstrated by the negative reception received
by many of its early opinions. Characteristic of the hostility to the Court during this
period was reaction of the Anti-Federalists to the Court’s opinion in Chisholm v
Georgia.118 Chisholm held that a state was not immune to suit by a private citizen in

later provide much of the eloquent ammunition against “separate but equal” laws. With the words, “the
Constitution is color blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens,” Harlan set the stage
for Brown v. Board of Education, 347 US 483 (1954), and much of the civil rights movement. This is the
power of dissent, for good or bad.
110 As noted by Professor David Currie, seriatim opinions may be beneficial in that they may
provide more information germane to predicting future outcomes. See D AVID P. CURRIE, THE
CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS, 1789-1888 14, n.61 (1985) (“Yet
seriatim opinions actually may give us a better basis for predicting later decisions.”).
111 3 U.S. 386 (1798).
112 Id. at 387 (interpreting article I, section 10).
113 CURRIE, supra note 110 at 44.
114 Id. at 45.
115 Id. at 55.
116 Furthermore, the circuit riding duties of the justices eroded the spirit and moral of the Court,
contributing to its ineffectiveness. These duties were especially draining of the justices’ energy because of
the difficulty of traveling during this era. When John Jay referred to a lack of “energy” on the Court, it was
riding circuit that was the likely culprit. Thus Congress, state legislatures, and state courts were the
dominant policy makers during this period.
117 See, e.g., E LLIS, supra note 93 at 12 (“Throughout George Washington’s first administration the
federal judiciary tried to avoid becoming engaged in political controversies or becoming entangled in
questions outside its immediate jurisdiction.”).
118 Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793).
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federal court.119 Legislators in Georgia responded to this decision by introducing a
constitutional amendment to restrict the power of federal courts to hear suits against
states brought by citizens of other states. This amendment quickly passed the
ratification requirements of Article V and became the Eleventh Amendment to the
Constitution.120 With this severe blow to the institutional power of the Court, Chief
Justice Jay abandoned his leadership of the Court in order to become governor of New
York.121 When asked by President John Adams to resume his duties in 1800, Jay refused
on the grounds that the Court lacked any prestige or authority and would be unable to
earn the “public confidence and respect.”122
Following Jay’s departure and the brief leadership of John Rutledge,123 Oliver
Ellsworth was appointed as chief justice. Ellsworth was an advocate of a stronger central
government. In order to increase federal power, Chief Justice Ellsworth attempted to
initiate a policy of handing down opinions per curiam—anonymous and unanimous
opinions that would emulate Mansfield’s opinion of the court. Ellsworth believed that by
issuing decisions that would speak for the Court as a whole without dissent, the power of
the Court, and thereby the power of the national government, would be increased. This
reform was unsuccessful in part because of the lack of political will on the part of those
opposed to seriatim opinions, in part because Ellsworth’s tenure as chief justice was
brief due to illness, and undoubtedly for other reasons as well.124 The seed, however,
that would allow the growth of national power was sowed.
When Ellsworth left office, however, the future of the Court was not clear. This
was in part because the Supreme Court’s very existence was questioned at the Founding.
Although eventually established as a tri-equal branch of government, the creation of a
national court was contested at the Constitutional Convention of 1787. The delegates
realized the need for a stronger national government than existed under the Articles of
Confederation but many representatives considered the existing state courts as
sufficient for interpreting national laws and thought the federal judiciary to be the
biggest potential “source of tyranny”.125
Id.
U.S. CONST. amend. XI (“The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens
of another state, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state.”). This was one of only two constitutional
amendments that was adopted explicitly to repudiate a Supreme Court decision—the other being the 16th
Amendment (federal income tax) which was in response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Pollock v.
Farmers’ Loan, 158 U.S. 601 (1895), which declared the federal income tax of 1894 unconstitutional.
121 Similarly, Robert H. Harrison refused an appointment to the Court in 1789 to become
chancellor of Maryland. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 20 at 133.
122 RICHARD MORRIS, JOHN JAY, THE NATION, AND THE COURT (1967). Jay “left the bench perfectly
convinced that under a system so defective it would not obtain the energy, weight, and dignity which are
essential to its affording due support to the national government, nor acquire the public confidence and
respect which, as a court of laws resort of the justice of the nation, it should possess.” 4 THE
CORRESPONDENCE AND PUBLIC PAPERS OF JOHN JAY 285 (1893).
123 John Rutledge was appointed by President Washington in 1795. Rutledge participated in two
cases as chief justice before his nomination was defeated in the Senate in December of 1795.
124 See WILLIAM G. BROWN, THE LIFE OF OLIVER ELLSWORTH (1905).
125 See JACK N. RAKOVE, O RIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE
CONSTITUTION 186 (1997) (describing the position of the Anti-Federalists as articulated by “Brutus”, a New
York writer responding to the Federalist Papers).
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In the end, Federalists, who envisioned a national judiciary to settle interstate
disputes, were victorious.126 The Supreme Court was their reward. By modern standards
this was a substantial expression of national power, but for the first decade of its
existence it remained untapped as the Supreme Court was neglected and ignored by
lawyers, politicians, and the public. The Court was not provided with a chambers and
the job of chief justice was refused by several prominent statesmen. According to the
first chief justice, John Jay, in its first ten years the Court “lacked energy, weight, and
dignity.”127 Everything changed with appointment of John Marshall as chief justice in
1801.
C. The Era of Unanimity
In 1800, the year of Ellsworth’s retirement from the Court, the Federalists, who
had dominated politics since 1789, were on the way out. The Federalists were advocates
of a strong central government, were skeptical of state powers, and distrusted direct
democracy. By contrast Jefferson’s Republicans emphasized the decentralized authority
of the states and the people. With the defeat of Federalist John Adams by Jefferson in
the election of 1800, the power of the central government seemed to be on the wane.
The outgoing Federalists, however, were not content to entrust the Constitution to
Jefferson’s Republicans.
Realizing that they were about to lose control of the only two branches of
government with any power, the Federalists looked to secure control of the third branch
as a possible bulwark of national power. The branch that they seized, however, needed
serious reform in order to be strong enough to counteract, or at least curtail, the power
of the new president and the Republican-controlled Congress. During its first 16 terms,
it heard only about 60 cases, only about 10 were of any significance, and when the
government moved to Washington in 1800, the Court had “no library, no office space,
no clerks or secretaries,” and heard cases on the first floor of the Capitol, “adjacent to
the main staircase”.128 For these reasons and because the power of the Court to interpret
the Constitution was not clear at this time, Alexander Hamilton described the judiciary
as “beyond comparison the weakest of the three branches.”129
1. The Marshall Court
The Federalist reform came in two forms: the outgoing Federalist Congress
passed the Judiciary Act of 1801, and lame duck President Adams appointed John
Marshall as chief justice. Each of these acts was intended not merely to secure Federalist
control of the Court, but to increase the power of the Court at the expense of the
legislative and executive branches.

See id.
MORRIS, supra note 122 at 81. See also, Robert P. Frankel, Jr., Judicial Beginnings: The
Supreme Court in the 1790s, 4 HISTORY COMPASS 1102, 1104 (2006).
128 JEAN EDWARD SMITH, JOHN MARSHALL: DEFINER OF A NATION 285 (1996).
129 THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 464-65 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999).
126
127

21

22 / Henderson
The Judiciary Act doubled the number of circuit courts (from three to six) and
created 16 new judgeships to fill them.130 This was intended to do two things to increase
Federalist control over the judiciary. First, it gave outgoing President Adams a chance to
populate the federal courts with Federalists. Second, it eliminated the circuit-riding
duties of Supreme Court justices, who previously sat on both the Supreme Court and on
the three existing circuit courts. This freed up Supreme Court judges from having to
hear cases outside of the Capital, and was designed to increase the Court’s prestige and
to increase the desirability of being a Supreme Court justice.
Riding circuit was a major impediment to an energetic and collegial Court. The
idea was that, relieved of their duties to travel and sit on other courts, the justices could
live together in Washington, enabling them to develop strong relationships and to work
united on important issues, giving the Court the “energy” that Jay claimed it lacked.
This reform was not effective, however, as the Republican-controlled Congress repealed
the Act in 1802, and Supreme Court justices continued to ride circuit until 1869.
The Federalist plan to control the judiciary therefore had to rely entirely on the
appointment of John Marshall to be chief justice of the United States. This was not lost
on Marshall. The day Federalist enemy President Jefferson was inaugurated, he wrote to
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney: “Of the importance of the judiciary at all times, but more
especially the present I am fully impressed. I shall endeavor in the new office to which I
am called not to disappoint my friends.”131
Marshall was an “ardent nationalist,” who considered himself an American before
a Virginian. He wrote that “I was confirmed in the habit of considering America as my
country and Congress as my government,. . . . I had imbibed these sentiments so
thoroughly that they constituted a part of my being.”132 Despite these firm beliefs in the
national government, Marshall was a reluctant political actor. Marshall entered politics
following Shays’s Rebellion of 1786 only because he felt that the nation was in danger of
collapse.133 Like the apparent danger posed by Daniel Shays, Marshall viewed
Republican control of the government as dangerous to his conception of the nation. The
“gloomy views”134 of Federalists upon Jefferson’s ascendancy were captured by John
Marshall in a letter he wrote to a Congressman from Massachusetts at the time: “I feel
that real Americanism is on the ebb.”135 Marshall carried his national spirit to the Court.
Unlike the failed attempt with the Judiciary Act, this tactic of the Federalists
proved to be a tremendous success. Marshall found a ready historical example of how
courts could increase their power in the experience of Lord Mansfield, who was a
“cultural hero of the American legal elite” at that time, and whose reform in the early
The Sixth Circuit only got one additional judge. The Act also created 10 new district courts,
overseen by existing district court judges, who were federalists. These were the famous “midnight judges”.
See David R. Stras, Why Supreme Court Justices Should Ride Circuit Again, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1710, 171921 (2007) (describing the Judiciary Act of 1801 as the “Midnight Judges Act”).
131 Letter from John Marshall to Charles Cotesworth Pinckney (Mar. 4, 1801), in 6 THE PAPERS OF
JOHN MARSHALL 89 (1990).
132 JOHN MARSHALL, A N AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 9-10 (John Stokes Adams, ed., 1937).
133 SMITH, supra note 128 at 5.
134 ALBERT J. BEVERIDGE JR., THE LIFE OF JOHN M ARSHALL 15 (1919) (“Of all the leading Federalists,
John Marshall was the only one who refused to ‘bawl,’ at least in the public ear; and yet, as we have seen
and shall again find, he entertained the gloomy views of his political associates.”).
135 Letter from John Marshall to Harrison Gray Otis (Aug. 5, 1800), in 4 M ARSHALL PAPERS, at
204-05.
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1760s was recent history for the Founders.136 Marshall increased the power of the Court
vis-à-vis the other branches of government by dramatically altering the way in which the
Court decided and announced its opinions, just as Mansfield did and for the same
reasons.
In an expression of raw political power, Marshall abandoned the tradition of
seriatim opinions and established an “Opinion of the Court” that would speak for all
justices through a single voice.137 This change was viewed as an “act[] of audacity” and
“assumption[] of power”.138 Marshall used his leadership skills, the power of persuasion,
and other tactics lost to history to convince the other five members of the Court that
they should abandon the Court’s accepted practice of issuing seriatim opinions. Cases
were now decided by private conference in which the justices achieved a compromise
position. An opinion, commanding an unknown vote, was drafted by an anonymous
justice and then issued under the name of “John Marshall” who signed for the Court:
“For the first time the Chief Justice disregarded the custom of delivery of opinions by
the Justices seriatim, and, instead, calmly assumed the function of announcing, himself,
the views of that tribunal.”139 Marshall’s great discursive revolution, which would cause
fundamental shifts in the power of American government, began boldly with the
Supreme Court’s decision in Talbot v. Seeman.140
Although the question presented in Talbot was on its face a simple admiralty
issue regarding payments owed in cases of salvage, the context of the case required the
Court to take sides in a political debate about a raging “quasi-war” with France. The ship
involved in the case was the “Amelia”, which was owned by Seeman, a resident of a
neutral city-state in the war between England and France. The ship, an armed merchant
ship carrying some English goods, was captured by the French and then recaptured by
Talbot, the captain of the American frigate “Constitution”.141 Talbot sued seeking salvage
rights—half of the value of the cargo—while Seeman argued that the ship was neutral
and in no danger of being condemned by the French, thus there was no service rendered
and therefore no salvage rights owed.
The controversy required the Court to not only decide the narrow question about
whether the risk of condemnation was sufficient to justify payment to Talbot, but also to
interpret conflicting congressional and presidential actions regarding America’s role in
the quasi-war with France. In short, the Court was being asked to make a highly political
statement in the guise of a salvage case.
The decision required the Court to decide two questions: (1) was the seizure by
Talbot legal, and (2) did Talbot provide a valuable service to Seeman. Federalists, who
were proponents of the war with France, argued strongly for Talbot; Republicans, who
wanted to avoid foreign entanglements and defended neutral shipping, argued strongly

FRIEDMAN, supra note 20 at 109.
See, e.g., WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, supra note 34 at 40 (2001) (“Marshall, in what one of his
biographers calls ‘an act of audacity,’ changed this tradition in the Supreme Court of the United States so
that an opinion for the Court was delivered by only one of the justices.”).
138 BEVERIDGE, supra note 134 at 16.
139 Id.
140 5 U.S. 1 (1801).
141 This is the famous “Old Ironsides”. See http://www.ussconstitution.navy.mil/.
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for Seeman.142 The Court answered both questions in the affirmative, but did so in a
manner designed to please or placate everyone, thereby allowing the Court to
dramatically increase its power. Marshall convinced the other justices that
[i]f a complex, politically charged case like Talbot could be resolved with a single
opinion, not only would the holding enjoy greater legitimacy, but the identity of
the Supreme Court as [the] nation’s highest tribunal would become manifest and
its prestige would be enhanced enormously.143
The decision the Court reached shows not only the compromise that the Court
needed to reach to speak with one voice but also the need to prevent a political backlash
against the Court’s new power play. The Court held for Talbot (a victory for the
Federalists who Marshall swore to serve), but it reduced Talbot’s salvage claim to onesixth of the ship’s value (down from the traditional half) and then allowed Seeman to
deduct his costs from this amount (a rarity), making the damages nominal (a victory for
the Republicans). Marshall created the power of the Court to decide whether
congressional statutes authorized seizure of vessels of foreign powers and what role the
executive had in foreign policy,144 while insulating the decision (and thus the new power)
from critics. Accepting the decision, which Jefferson and the Republicans did
reluctantly, opened the door for the Court to assert, just two years later, the power of
judicial review in Marbury v. Madison.
Thus was born the “Opinion of the Court,” which, in a revised form, survives to
this day. The Court now had weight and dignity as well as energy, and it was not subject
to political sniping. John Jay’s challenge was met, and the Court was then able to assert
itself as a tri-equal branch of government.145 This innovation – a paradigmatic shift in
legal discourse – initiated a new era of Supreme Court power. The result was a focusing
of the power of the national judiciary, and consequently, the shift in the locus of power
from the nonlegal to the legal, and from the states to the federal government. This
evolution in the function of law was enabled through a change in the form in which law
is established and delivered. In 1801, the form of legal discourse transmogrified to adapt
to Law’s new role in the emerging modern world.
* * *

142 To add to the mystique of the case, on appeal from a district court ruling for Talbot, Federalist
Alexander Hamilton represented Talbot, while Republican, and Hamilton’s archenemy and eventual
murderer, Aaron Burr represented Seeman.
143 SMITH, supra note 128 at 293.
144 In an oft quoted passage, the Court wrote: “The whole powers of war being, by the Constitution
of the United States, vested in Congress, the Acts of that body can alone be resorted to as our guides in
this enquiry.” See Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. at 28.
145 See William J. Brennan Jr., In Defense of Dissents, supra note 9 at 427 (“This change in
custom at the time consolidated the authority of the Court and aided in the general recognition of the
Third Branch as co-equal partner with the other branches. Not surprisingly, not everyone was pleased
with the new practice.”).
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During the first ten years as chief justice, Marshall “wrote” 90 percent of the
opinions for the Court.146 The only opinions that were not issued under his name during
this period were in cases where Marshall tried the case below while riding circuit,147
where he had a personal interest in the case,148 or when he rarely dissented from his
fellow justices.149 Marshall did himself dissent occasionally, but he generally led by
example and acquiesced to the compromise position. This is demonstrated by
comparing Marshall’s dissenting proclivity with his successors. As shown on Table A, in
the entire history of the Court, Marshall is the chief justice least likely to dissent.
TABLE A: Dissenting Behavior of Chief Justices
Number of
Chief Justice
Dates of
Dissenting
Chief Justice
Service
Number of Cases Opinions
Marshall
1801-1835
1187
3
Taney
1836-1863
1708
38
Chase
1864-1873
1109
33
Waite
1874-1887
2642
45
Fuller
1888-1909
4866
113
White
1910-1920
2541
39
Taft
1921-1929
1708
16
Hughes
1930-1940
2050
46
Stone
1941-1945
704
95
Vinson
1946-1952
723
90
Warren
1953-1968
1772
215
Burger
1969-1985
2755
184
Rehnquist
1986-2005
2131
182
Roberts
2005-present 104
3

Dissent
Proportion
(percent)
0
2
3
2
2
2
1
2
13
12
12
7
9
3

Source: Westlaw SCT database
Marshall’s plan was a dramatic success. From 1801 to 1835 there were very few
dissenting opinions from the hundreds of opinions of the Court (Figure 1) and the Court
decided such fundamental legal issues as the supremacy of federal law, judicial review,150
the implied powers of the national government,151 the Court’s power over state court

146 Opinions were issued under Marshall’s name in all cases in 1801, 1805, and 1806; in 91 percent
of cases in 1803; 89 percent in 1804; 90 percent in 1807, 83 percent in 1808; 88 percent in 1809; 73
percent in 1810; and 58 percent in 1812. Over the next 23 years, Marshall accounted for only about 40
percent of opinions. This remains, however, about four times as many opinions as are written by Chief
Justice Rehnquist.
147 See, e.g., Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. 299 (1803).
148 See, e.g., Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304 (1816).
149 See, e.g., Bank of the U.S. v. Dandridge, 25 U.S. 64 (1827).
150 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
151 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
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decisions implicating federal questions,152 and federal power over interstate commerce153
without much dispute, open challenge, or probability of reversal.
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Figure 1: Dissenting Opinions in the Supreme Court
During the Marshall Court (1801-1835)

Year
Source: Westlaw Supreme Court database (SCT-OLD)

In fact, it was not until 1804 when President Jefferson appointed Justice William
Johnson, who would be known as the “First Dissenter”, that the first dissenting opinion
was recorded.154 Jefferson recognized this change in discourse as a blatant attempt to
counteract the results of the congressional and presidential elections, and to increase
the power of the judiciary. “The Federalists,” he wrote “retreated into the Judiciary as a
stronghold, the tenure of which renders it difficult to dislodge them.”155 In order to
counter the lack of political accountability in the Court, Jefferson urged Republicanappointed judges to revert to the practice of seriatim opinions.156 Most famously, a
series of letters between Jefferson and Johnson in 1822 in which the former urged the
latter to dissent in nearly every case. This urging was somewhat successful at breaking
Marshall’s grip on the Court. As shown on Figure 1, the number of dissenting opinions
increased in the later years of the Marshall Court as Jefferson appointees began to
disrupt the practice of unanimity. After ten years of near unanimity, the next 25 years
saw an increased number of dissenting opinions.
Notwithstanding the increase in the number of dissents, the result was still only
one dissent in about every twenty-five cases decided during the Marshall Court, the
152 Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304 (1816) (Marshall recused himself because he was
personally involved in this case; Joseph Story wrote the opinion); Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheaton 264
(1821).
153 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824).
154 See Herbert v. Wren, 11 U.S. 370 (1813). Johnson’s first dissent was tentative: the report states
that he dissented but “did not state his reasons”. Id. at 382.
155 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN U NITED S TATES HISTORY v 1, 193 (1926).
156 For example, many of Jefferson’s letters cited above were correspondence between Jefferson
and Justice Johnson in which Jefferson extolled the virtues of traditional seriatim opinions.
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lowest percentage in the history of the Court.157 The dissenting opinions of the Marshall
Court are listed in the Appendix. Notably, of the 52 dissenting opinions issued during
the Marshall Court, Jefferson appointees William Johnson and Brockholst Livingston
authored almost 60 percent.158 Although law at the time of the Marshall Court was
considered less political than it is today, even at this early time, dissent was often an
overtly political act. Still, Johnson—on a political mission of sorts—sided with Marshall
far more often than not, signing the Opinion of the Court about 96 percent of the
time.159 According to legal historian Lawrence Friedman, Johnson was under Marshall’s
“spell.”160
Although Marshall did effectively control the discourse of the Court, he did not
dominate the “thinking” of the Court.161 Instead, Marshall effectively led the Court.
Marshall established and maintained an atmosphere during conferences that was
conducive to compromise. After the decision was made, Marshall managed the public
and political perception of the Court through the issuance of unanimous and
anonymous opinions. Without disagreements, the opinions carried greater authority,
and individual justices were shielded from outrage or impeachment charges.162
This “authority” was simply assumed by Marshall, and it has remained virtually
unquestioned for over 200 years. Many powerful individuals have tried to usurp it –
President Jefferson tried to impeach Justice Chase; President Jackson refused to
enforce decisions he disagreed with; President Lincoln famously refused to enforce a
writ of habeas corpus issued by Chief Justice Taney; several presidents either increased

See Figure 3.
Johnson and Livingston (Jefferson appointees) authored 20 and 9 respectively; Thompson
(Monroe appointee) authored 6; Baldwin and McLean (Jackson appointees) authored 6 and 2
respectively; Story and Duvall (Madison appointees) authored 4 and 1; Chase (Washington appointee)
authored 3; Marshall and Washington (Adams appointees) authored 3 and 1.
159 Johnson heard approximately 977 cases during his time on the Court (1805-1833); he
dissented or wrote seriatim 39 times (or in 4% of cases). See David G. Morgan, The Origin of Supreme
Court Dissent, 10 WILLIAM & MARY QUARTERLY 353, 377 (1953).
160 FRIEDMAN, supra note 20 at 128.
161 HERBERT A. JOHNSON, THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIP OF JOHN MARSHALL, 1801-1835 51 (1997) (noting
that there is “undeniable evidence that Chief Justice Marshall did not dominate his colleagues; the
domination theory has been so thoroughly refuted that Professor David Currie referred to it as the story of
‘John Marshall and the six dwarfs.’”).
162 Although the call to impeach a Supreme Court justice for a particular decision seems
outrageous today, during this era, such charges were frequently threatened and occasionally levied against
judges. For example, in 1805 Associate Justice Samuel Chase was impeached by the House and tried in
the Senate. The ground for the impeachment was Chase’s handling of several criminal trials in which he
tried to implement the Adams Administration’s attempts to silence political foes. However, the charges
against Chase were shown to be politically motivated and he was acquitted in the Senate. Judge Charles
Pickering was not so lucky. A Federalist judge who “had committed no ‘high crimes and misdemeanors’”
but was “a drunk, seriously deranged,” and overtly political in his handling of cases was impeached and
convicted in 1804. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 20 at 129-130. This impeachment, like that of Alexander
Addison, a Federalist judge from Pennsylvania who “harangued grand juries on political subjects” and was
impeached and removed from office in 1803, was Jefferson’s attempt to create a “bogeyman” to threaten
judges into good behavior. Id. at 129. Historians believe that it was largely effective, much like Roosevelt’s
“court packing plan” 150 years later. Id. at 129, 132 (“The failure of [the Chase] impeachment was not a
clear-cut victory for either side. . . . The judges won independence, but at a price. Their openly political
role was reduced.”).
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or proposed enlarging the Court to alter its power;163 and numerous representatives and
senators have proposed curtailing Supreme Court power through legislation164 – but
none have succeeded in undoing the institutional authority created in large part by
Marshall’s discursive change.
Marshall was able to achieve the power of unanimity and effectuate a
fundamental change in legal discourse based, at least in part, on his own personal
leadership skills. Marshall was revered for his ability to lead and to relate to others.
Biographers describe him as able to “inspire confidence and trust” and “able to elicit a
warm and supportive response from others.”165 In a famous quote, fellow justice Joseph
Story responded to questions about Marshall’s motives on the Court: “I love his laugh—
it is too hearty for an intriguer.”166 Whether Marshall had a strategy or whether he was
an “intriguer,” is a question without an easy answer. Jefferson famously accused

The number of Supreme Court justices was originally set at six. See Judiciary Act of 1789
[insert proper cite]. Changes in the number of justices have been made or proposed many times for
political reasons. For example, when Jefferson was elected in 1800, the outgoing Federalist Congress
reduced the number of justices to five, but this was increased to six and then seven by Republicans in
Congress to give Jefferson two appointments. See [insert cite]. Andrew Jackson got two appointments
when the Court grew to nine in 1837. See [insert cite]. Anti-slavery forces increased the Court to ten, but
then after the Civil War, the Republicans reduced the number to seven to ensure Democrat Andrew
Johnson would not get any appointments. See [insert cite]. When a Republican, U.S. Grant, was elected in
1868, the Republicans gave him two new justices to appoint, expanding the Court back to nine. See [insert
cite]. His nominees quickly made an impact, voting to reverse the Court’s recently created precedent in
the Legal Tender cases. See [insert cite]. More recently, Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s Court-packing plan
did not succeed in increasing the number of justices, but it did cause enough justices to reverse opposition
to the New Deal to achieve the results intended. See [insert cite].
164 For example, Senator Charles Sumner of Massachusetts was concerned that the Supreme Court
would hold Congress’ reconstruction laws unconstitutional, so he introduced a bill in 1869 that would
dramatically curtail the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction: “The judicial power extends only to cases between
party and party . . . and does not include the President or Congress, or any of their acts . . . and all such
acts are valid and conclusive on the matters to which they apply; . . . and no allegation
or pretence of the invalidity thereof shall be excuse or defense for any neglect, refusal, or failure to
perform any duty in regard to them." See Congressional Globe, 41st Congress, 2nd Session, at 2895
(1869). Senator Lyman Trumbell of Illinois proposed a similar, albeit more narrow, limitation on the
Court in 1868 and 1869, arguing that the reconstruction acts were “political in character” and the Court
had no jurisdiction to pass upon them. See 40th Congress, 2nd Session, at 1204, 1428, 1621 (1868); see
also 41st Congress, 2nd Session, at 3, 27, 45, 96, 152, 167 (1869). Senator Richard M. Johnson of
Kentucky proposed giving the Senate appellate jurisdiction in cases in which the government was a party,
allowing the Senate to effectively overrule Supreme Court opinions. See Annals of Congress, 17th
Congress, 1st Session, Dec. 12, 1821, Jan. 14 and 15, 1822. In response to the Supreme Court’s rejection of
much progressive legislation in the pre-New Deal period, Senator Robert M. LaFollette, Sr. of Wisconsin
proposed a constitutional amendment that would allow two thirds of the Senate to overrule any decision
of the Court. See Congressional Record, 67th Con2nd at 9073, Reprint of LaFollette's speech before the
American Federation of Labor.
165 JOHNSON, supra note 161 at 21.
166 SMITH, supra note 128 at 291.
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Marshall of deliberately manipulating the Constitution to achieve his own ends,167 and
some modern observes agree, viewing his early opinions as highly political.168
Marshall had nationalist tendencies, but so did his predecessor Chief Justice
Ellsworth and many of his successors. But only Marshall was able to implement these
tendencies in practice. What made Marshall different was his ability to assert the type of
personal leadership necessary to achieve the goal of strong national power. But there
were many “conditions of possibility” that enabled this change. Marshall and his fellow
justices were able to achieve considerable unanimity because of their similar socioeconomic backgrounds. Justices were drawn entirely from the cadre of practicing
lawyers or the government elite. All of the justices were propertied gentlemen and each
had a strong sense of nationalism, a concern for private property rights, and accepted
traditional principles of the legal profession of the era.169 In addition, for the first several
decades of Court history, the justices all lived at a boardinghouse in Washington. This
living arrangement added to the collegial environment of the Court and helped foster
similar views among justices. Whatever the exact mix of reasons, Marshall was able to
increase the power of the Court through a change in the discourse of the Court.
2. The continuing tradition
Unlike the experience with the “opinion of the court” in England, in this country
the unanimity consensus continued to a great extent even after Marshall left the Court
in 1835. Although the number of separate opinions increased slightly after Marshall
resigned from the Court, Marshall’s practice of unanimity dominated the Supreme Court
for over 100 years (Figure 2).

167 “In Marshall’s hands the law is nothing more than an ambiguous text to be explained by his
sophistry into any meaning which may subserve his personal malice.” Letter from Jefferson to Madison
(May 25, 1810) in THE REPUBLIC OF LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THOMAS JEFFERSON AND
JAMES MADISON 64 (M. Smith, ed. 1995).
168 See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Marbury, Section 13, and the Original Jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 443 (1989); John V. Orth, Book Review: John Marshall and the Rule of Law, 49
S.C. L. REV. 633, 636 (1998) (“Marshall did seem to have a strategic vision of forcing . . . the national
government to govern the nation.”).
169 JOHNSON, supra note 161 at 96-97.
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The unanimity discourse of Marshall changed over time. By 1814, Marshall did
not sign the vast majority of opinions, but instead authored only about 50 percent. This
was still a significant amount (especially compared to the approximately 15 percent of
opinions authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist during his tenure), but it represented a
changing of the guard. Furthermore, Jefferson appointees hostile to Marshall were
beginning to assert their power on the Court, and other factors led to a decline in the
collegiality of the Court. For example, by 1827, under pressure from Republicans and
because newly appointed justices established residences in Washington, the
“boardinghouse Court” was abolished. This would seriously undermine attempts to hold
the Court together in unanimous blocks.170 In addition, many new justices who did not
live in the boardinghouse renounced the brotherhood spirit that prevailed in the early
Marshall Court.171 Evidence of the factions developing in the Court at this time is the fact
that the percent of cases with a dissenting opinion increased from four percent under
Marshall to nearly ten percent under his immediate successors.
Despite these changes, the period from the end of Marshall’s term in 1835 to the
beginning of John Harlan Stone’s term in 1941 saw little change in the discourse of
Supreme Court opinions.172 Table B shows the frequency of dissenting opinions during
each chief justiceship.
TABLE B: Dissenting Proclivity
Chief Justice
Dates of Service

Percent of Opinions with a Dissent

Id. at 110-11.
Id.
172 “Yet, neither [Justice] Johnson nor any alter Justices could or would undo Marshall’s work.
Doctrine changed; personalities and blocs clashed on the Supreme Court; power contended with power;
but these struggles all took place within the fortress that Marshall had built.” FRIEDMAN, supra note 20 at
134.
170
171

A Theory of Dissent / 31
Marshall
Taney
Chase
Waite
Fuller
White
Taft
Hughes
Stone
Vinson
Warren
Burger
Rehnquist
Roberts

1801-1835
1836-1863
1864-1873
1874-1887
1888-1909
1910-1920
1921-1929
1930-1940
1941-1945
1946-1952
1953-1968
1969-1985
1986-2005
2005-Present

4
9
9
6
7
5
7
9
27
48
50
59
56
47

As shown on this table, the rate remained relatively constant at less than ten
percent. Two primary factors seem to explain this result. First, the traits and leadership
of the chief justices who succeeded Marshall; and, second, the legal atmosphere of the
period and the type of cases heard by the Court.
As for leadership, each chief justice from Marshall to Stone came from similar
backgrounds,173 had remarkable leadership skills, and was committed to unanimity
above all else. Melville Fuller (1888-1910) was described as an “excellent social
leader….blessed with conciliatory and diplomatic traits.”174 Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes characterized him as the greatest chief justice because of his ability to conduct
the business of the Court without much dissent.175 Likewise, Chief Justice Edward White
(1910-1920), was a former senate majority leader blessed with a “genial temperament
and adroit logrolling skills that permitted him to mend fences and reinforce consensus
norms in Court.”176 Following White was the legendary consensus builder, William
Howard Taft (1921-1929). Taft “hated dissenting opinions, wrote very few himself, and
made every effort to dissuade others from writing them.”177 Taft wrote that “I don’t
approve of dissents generally, for I think in many cases where I differ from the majority,
it is more important to stand by the Court and give its judgment weight than merely to
record my individual dissent where it is better to have the law certain than to have it
settled either way.”178 Taft imparted this tendency to his successor Charles Evans
Hughes (1930-1940). Hughes discouraged dissent in order (to) shield internal divisions
from public view.179 In a personal letter to another justice, Hughes explained why he
173 Marshall, like his successors, was first and foremost a lawyer. He spent a career representing
business interests in Virginia, and, like most of his contemporaries of the bench and bar, was a significant
property owner. CHARLES F. HOBSON, THE GREAT CHIEF JUSTICE: JOHN MARSHALL AND THE RULE OF LAW 74
(1996).
174 SHELDON GOLDMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND SUPREME COURT DECISION-M AKING 178 (1982).
175 Id. at 178-79.
176 James Watts, Edward Douglas White, in 3 THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT 1789-1969 (Leon Friedman and Fred Israel, eds., 1969).
177 EDWARD WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION 180 (1976).
178 WALTER MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL S TRATEGY 61 (1964).
179 HENRY ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIAL P ROCESS 230 (1986).
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would join the majority opinion despite his strong reservations about the outcome: “I
choke a little at swallowing your analysis, still I do not think it would serve any useful
purpose to expose my views.”180
In terms of case characteristics, many of the cases heard by the Court during this
period were rather straightforward common law or admiralty cases and were therefore
less contentious politically than modern cases.181 Talbot was the rare admiralty case, in
that it involved questions of war and peace, as well as the power of the other two
branches. Most Supreme Court cases were not like Talbot. These decisions were able to
garner greater consensus in part because the common law provided numerous
precedents. It was not until after the Erie decision in 1938 when federal common law
was abandoned that the Supreme Court would routinely handle difficult, and politically
sensitive, constitutional issues.182 In fact, federal courts did not have general federal
question jurisdiction to hear matters arising under the Constitution and laws of the
United States until 1875. This change from a common law court of last resort to a
constitutional court caused a dramatic increase in the percentage of cases with a
dissenting opinion. Consider that for its first 150 years, the Court did not decide a single
case involving civil liberties, as we understand them today. The first cases to uphold civil
liberties were the tripartite of test-oath cases (Ex parte Milligan, Ex parte Garland, and
Ex parte Cummings) decided in 1866. There would be more contentious cases during
the next few decades, including the upholding of “separate but equal laws” in Plessy v.
Ferguson in 1896, but the Court’s cases were largely not politically contentious in the
modern sense until the New Deal.
D. The Rise of Dissent
The long-standing practice of virtual unanimity was abandoned as abruptly as it
was begun. With the ascendancy of John Harlan Stone to chief justice in 1941, the Court
began a trend writing separate opinions in most cases (Figure 2). Several possibilities
may explain the rise, but one stands out in historical perspective.
For one, Stone tolerated and even encouraged dissent out of personal preference
and practice. Stone was the first academic appointed to hold the position of chief justice,
and this background made him more likely to want to encourage open debate. This
academic pedigree and his personality, which favored debate and confrontation,
manifest themselves in his frequent dissents during his time as an associate justice. This
Id. at 224.
Of the nearly 400 cases decided by the Supreme Court between 1801 and 1833, less than 50 (or
about 12 percent) were “constitutional” cases according to Professor David Currie. See CURRIE, supra note
110 at 65-193 (collecting and treating these cases; number counted by author). The most common cases
during this time were traditional common law cases: property (17 percent), admiralty/prize cases in which
the Court was an instance court (15 percent), procedure (15 percent), family law (10 percent), and
contracts (9 percent). Chief Justice Rehnquist also describes 19th Century Supreme Court jurisprudence as
largely run-of-the-mill by today’s standards, noting that the Court spent considerable time during the
1860’s and 1870’s on railroad bond cases. See REHNQUIST, supra note 34 at 90-1.
182 Erie Railroad Co v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Prior to 1938, many constitutional
questions of great import were decided, but the Supreme Court docket consisted mainly of routine
common law and admiralty cases. Some of the more famous dissents of the early period arose in the tough
constitutional questions. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York 198 U.S. 45 (1905), Scott v. Sanford 60 U.S. 393
(1857), and Plessy v. Ferguson 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
180
181
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proclivity to dissent continued when Stone was appointed chief justice—Stone was much
more likely to dissent himself compared to his predecessors and remains the chief
justice most likely to dissent (Table A). Just as chief justices from Marshall to Taft
encouraged unanimity by their own practice of acquiescing in opinions with which they
did not fully agree, so did Chief Justice Stone and his successors lead by example by
issuing a substantial number of dissenting opinions themselves. This leadership may be
a partial explanation for the dramatic increase in dissenting opinions during this time.
It is Stone’s leadership that scholars argue caused the end of the consensus
norm.183 For example, in the most prominent study of dissent in the political science
literature, several possible explanations for the change in Supreme Court discourse were
considered, but the authors concluded that, like the case of John Marshall and the rise
of the unanimity norm, it was the leadership of Chief Justice Stone that was responsible
for the change.184
Other possible explanations examined by the authors were the change in docket
from mandatory to discretionary review, the shift in the type of cases argued before the
Court, internal politics of the Court, and large-scale changes in Court personnel at the
time. Let us look at some of the theories considered and rejected:
First, the authors examined the role of the Judiciary Act of 1925 and the move to
a discretionary docket. Although it is possible that the new jurisdiction of discretion
could create more dissent because only difficult and contentious cases would be granted
certiorari, the authors conclude that this change was not responsible for the increase in
dissents based on the fact that the rise in dissents is not seen until 1942, many years
after passage of the Act.185 The time gap may be sufficient evidence that the direct or
only cause of the change was not the Judiciary Act. It does not, however, eliminate the
change in jurisdiction as a “condition of possibility” that contributed to the change in
discourse.
Another explanation considered and rejected by the authors was the increase in
the Supreme Court caseload in the past 100 years. The authors reject this explanation
out of hand because of a difference in timing. Although they argue that a dramatic
increase in cases results in less time to build consensus and construct compromises,
they conclude that the timing is again all wrong—the growth in the caseload they
observed was not dramatic until 1960’s, 20 years after the rise of dissent. The authors’
data confuses the rise in federal cases, which started in the 1960s, and the rise in the
number of Supreme Court opinions, which occurred much earlier and then
subsequently decreased. The data presented in Figure 3 show a growth in Supreme
Court cases following the Civil War and a decrease in opinions by the time of the Stone
Court (1941-45).

183 Thomas Walker, et al., On the Mysterious Demise of Consensual Norms in the United States
Supreme Court, 50 J. POL. 361, 362 (1988).
184 Id.
185 Id. at 364-65.
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The data suggest that the change in the number of opinions issued is inversely
related to the number of dissenting opinions. The five-fold increase in Supreme Court
decisions in the 1860’s was not accompanied by an increase in dissenting opinions. By
contrast, the drop in the number of Supreme Court cases following the Judiciary Act of
1925 corresponds well with the increase in dissenting opinions. In addition, the
Rehnquist Court heard fewer cases per year than any Court of the last 100 years, but
nearly 50 percent of all opinions had a dissent; the Roberts Court appears to be
following a similar pattern. This inverse relation suggests that it was more likely the
change in the type of cases that resulted in more dissenting opinions rather than the
change in the number of opinions.
The authors also briefly considered this possible explanation when they analyzed
the type of cases heard before the Stone Court and its predecessor, the Hughes Court.
The authors concluded that there was not a significant increase in the type of cases they
describe as “dissent prone.” This analysis ignores the fundamental change in the role of
the Court post-Erie as discussed above. The Court was, by the time of Stone’s
ascendancy to chief justice, becoming a constitutional court rather than a supreme
common law court. Certainly the increase in contentious, political cases seen during the
1940s made for a more fertile ground for dissent. It was at this time that “the cutting
edge debate [of] constitutional law shifted from . . . economic regulation . . . to claims of
civil liberties violations on behalf of various kinds of dissidents.”186 The unquestionable
growth in dissent-prone cases was caused in part by the fact that during this time the
Court issued a series of cases that extended the protections of the Bill of Rights to state
law through the Fourteenth Amendment.187
REHNQUIST, supra note 34 at 174-75.
The “incorporation” of the Bill of Rights via the Fourteenth Amendment is a controversial
constitutional question. In a recent essay, David Strauss notes that the issue “went from being a subject of
intense controversy--probably the most controversial issue in constitutional law between the mid-1940s
and mid-1950s, and one of the most controversial for a decade or more thereafter--to being a completely
settled issue.” See David A. Strauss, Common Law, Common Ground, and Jefferson’s Principle, 112 YALE
186
187
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But like the possible causes noted above, this explanation cannot be viewed in a
vacuum. The law and society was in great flux at this time. The rise of New Deal
constitutionalism replaced the long history of Lochner constitutionalism in the first
major reversal of Supreme Court jurisprudence. Holmes’s dissent in Lochner was
vindicated and somewhat revered after it became the law of the land in 1937. Dissent
proved to be a powerful weapon for change. Furthermore, this time saw the rise of legal
realism as a counter to the traditional use of natural law. During the majority of
Supreme Court history, the Court acted as a sort of an Oracle of the Law. In the grand
formal style, the justices would, through their internal debate, derive the correct answer
or the “truth” of the law.
This idea that there was a truth behind the law began to evaporate in legal
academic circles by the 1920s. Although Holmes in his Lowell Lectures on the common
law in 1881 argued that many extralegal matters affected the law more than abstract
logic or natural law, it was not until forty years later that this would become a
mainstream idea in the legal academy. Coincidentally, the rise of legal realism was
centered at Yale and Columbia during the late teens and early 1920s when future Chief
Justice Stone was dean of the Columbia Law School (1910-1923). Stone was educated in,
and as dean participated in the creation of, a vastly different legal world than known by
any of his predecessors. The broad social forces that led to the New Deal, the rise of legal
realism, and the change in the cases heard by the Court greatly contributed to Stone’s
attitude about law and about how “truth” should be determined.
By 1941, the Court was also populated with a more diverse (at least intellectually
diverse) group of justices than at any earlier time. During the 1920’s when Stone
ascended to the Court, the legal realists and the new process for deciding the law were
well represented on the Court by Justice Brandeis. Brandeis, like Holmes, was revered
for his powerful dissents and his passion for change in the law. Dissenting in Gilbert v
Minnesota, Brandeis first suggested that the liberties protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment should include civil liberties as well as property rights.188 This period of
history was a wellspring for change in the law and it was at the Supreme Court that the
L.J. 1717, 1746 (2003). Although the first right to be incorporated, the Takings Clause, occurred in the late
Nineteenth Century, see Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railway Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897), the
period around Stone’s tenure saw the greatest activity of incorporation by the Court. See Gitlow v. New
York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (incorporating freedom of speech clause); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697
(1931) (incorporating freedom of the press clause); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (incorporating
right to assistance of counsel in capital criminal cases); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937)
(incorporating freedom of assembly clause); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (incorporating
free exercise of religion clause); Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (incorporating
establishment of religion clause); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948) (incorporating public trial right); Wolf
v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) (incorporating unreasonable search and seizure clause). The
incorporation parade paused for a decade or so before resuming in the civil-rights era of the Sixties and
Seventies. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (incorporating right to assistance of counsel in
all felony cases); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (incorporating right to confrontation of adverse
witnesses); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (incorporating right to speedy trial);
Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (incorporating right to compulsory process to obtain witness
testimony); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (incorporating trial by impartial jury); Rabe v.
Washington, 405 U.S. 313 (1972) (incorporating notice of accusation). Some rights have not been
incorporated (yet). See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974) (addressing right to jury trial in civil cases);
Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886) (rejecting incorporation of 2nd Amendment).
188 See Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325 (1920).
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reformers were able, through the use of reasoning of past dissenting opinions, to achieve
their revolution.
Chief Justice Stone admired the practice of dissent and its recent history in the
Court. He knew the power of Holmes and Brandeis to change the law through dissent,
and Stone sought to encourage the practice.189 Therefore, compared to earlier chief
justices who sought compromise above all else, Stone was an ineffective “leader.” His
conference debates were heated and filled with controversy.190 In them, Stone
encouraged dissent stating that “[t]he right of dissent is an important one and has
proved to be such in the history of the Supreme Court . . . I do not think it is the
appropriate function of a Chief Justice to attempt to dissuade members of the Court
from dissenting in individual cases.”191 The “history” that Stone was referring to was the
recent vindication of Holmes’s dissent in Lochner. Stone was a new breed of lawyer in
control of the law’s most powerful entity during a fundamental change in our
understanding of legal reasoning. Law was now politics to a great extent, and Stone was
willing to assert the Supreme Court as a political branch. Stone achieved this revolution
at the Court by increasing the use of dissenting opinions just as Marshall implemented
his revolution by introducing the unanimity consensus. As discussed briefly below, the
means were different, but the ends were the same.
Stone increased the power of the Court, and thus achieved the same results as
Marshall, but for different reasons and under different circumstances. Both Marshall
and Stone were about achieving a more active political role for the Court. To increase
the power of the Court specifically and the law generally, Stone encouraged debate and
controversy rather than suppressing it as Marshall was required to do to accomplish the
same end. Only through the use of dissent could Stone extend the reach of the Court
from primarily economic matters into the realm of civil liberties.
It is not necessary to say that Stone knew that increasing tolerance for and
practice of dissent was likely to have the impact that it did on the Court’s domination of
controversial public policy questions. The practice here, like that for Marshall, may well
have been one that seemed natural, reflected the mood of the times, and been merely a
satisfaction of the preferences of those on the Court. But it is unmistakable when viewed
in light of the other discursive changes, that these explanations are just the surface or
“conditions of possibility”(you put quotes around it elsewhere) that undergird the true
sociological explanation for the practice.
Unlike the quick reversion to traditional methods of opinion delivery in England
and Virginia, after Stone’s brief tenure as chief justice, the unanimity rule was dead for
good. This was in spite of immediate steps to reverse the trend. To replace Stone as chief

189 The most startling example of this power comes from the cases Minersville School District v.
Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), and West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). In
Gobitis, Chief Justice Stone dissented from a 8-member majority holding that Jehovah’s Witnesses could
be expelled from public school for failing to salute the flag during the Pledge of Allegiance. Gobitis, 310
U.S. at 601-02. In the very next term, five justices were persuaded by Stone’s dissent, and voted to
overrule Gobitis in a case again involving Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Pledge. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642
190 David Danelski, The Influence of the Chief Justice in the Decisional Process of the Supreme
Court, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING (PAGE), (PAGE) (Joel Grossman and Richard
Wells eds., 1980).
191 ALPHEUS MASON, HARLAN FISKE S TONE: PILLAR OF THE L AW 608 (1956).
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justice, President Truman chose Fred Vinson, who was know for his sociable and likable
personality.
Although Truman admired Vinson’s record . . . his
personality was the most important factor influencing the
decision to appoint him . . .. His sociability and friendliness,
his calm, patient, and relaxed manner, his sense of humor,
his respect for the views of others, his popularity with the
representatives of many factions, and his ability to conciliate
conflicting views and clashing personalities and to work out
compromises were qualities that Truman admired. Even
more important, those personal qualities seemed to the
President to fit the needs of the situation inside the Supreme
Court. Dissension and dissent were on the rise . . . Vinson
seemed capable of unifying the Court and thereby improving
its public image.192
But eight justices were already in place and were all influenced by Stone and the concept
of legal realism. They were aware too that dissent enabled them to expand their role and
power over policy issues. Once the genie was out of the bottle it was impossible to put it
back in.193 Instead of working toward compromise and consensus, the Vinson court
became known as “nine scorpions in a bottle.”194
The “failure” of Vinson need not be viewed as a personal failure of leadership.
The context in which each of these chief justices tried to lead was different for a variety
of reasons. Even Marshall would not have been able to achieve unanimity in the
Supreme Court of Vinson’s day. The Vinson Court and the Marshall Court both existed
during a period of legal revolution. At the time of John Marshall, however, the Court
and the justices were certain about the role of law. Marshall merely redirected the Court
toward a more active political role. In fact, it is a natural conclusion of the thesis of this
paper that if Marshall were chief justice during this time, he would have been
instrumental in leading the change from unanimity to the dissent norm. In both cases, it
was the end result—an increased political role for the law and the Court—that was
important, not the means.
In contrast to the end of the Marshall Court, during the Stone Court and later
Courts, the dispute was not only about the political nature of the Court, but the broader
question of the role of law in society. Achieving unanimity in this context is much more
difficult and might have the opposite of the desired effect. The justices, despite
somewhat similar backgrounds, were likely to have different perspectives on diverse
social issues such as the rights of women, segregation, or abortion. In addition, the
Court does not act in a political vacuum, and the issuance of a unanimous, per curiam
opinion “deciding” a particularly thorny issue might provoke an extra-judicial or even
extra-legal response.
192 Richard Kirkendall, Fred M. Vinson, in 4 THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED S TATES SUPREME COURT
1789-1969 2641 (Leon Friedman and Fred Israel eds., 1969).
193 See, e.g., REHNQUIST, supra note 34 at 148 (“Brought in as a mediator, Vinson largely failed in
this task.”).
194 ROBERT S TEAMER, CHIEF JUSTICE: LEADERSHIP AND THE SUPREME COURT 19 (1986).
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Justice Frankfurter portended the surge in dissents in one of his first opinions,
written in 1939. Frankfurter praised the seriatim tradition in England, an odd thing to
do in a judicial opinion, calling it a “healthy practice”, but noting that the Court’s
workload prohibited them from doing it in every case.195 He then suggested that the
Court use the seriatim approach “when an important shift in constitutional doctrine is
announced after a reconstruction in the membership of the Court.” 196 This idea—that all
justices should be heard from on big questions—originated with Madison, who wrote in
an 1819 letter:
I could have wished also that the Judges had delivered their opinions seriatim.
The case was of such magnitude, in the scope given to it, as to call, if any case
could do so, for the views of the subject separately taken by them. This might
either by the harmony of their reasoning have produced a greater conviction in
the Public mind; or by its discordance have impaired the force of the precedent
now ostensibly supported by a unanimous & perfect concurrence in every
argument & dictum in the judgment pronounced.197
Frankfurter’s suggestion is notable because it previews both the constitutional
showdowns to come, as well as the role of dissent (if not seriatim) in giving the Court
legitimacy to decide these disputes. As Jefferson noted when advocating the writing of
separate opinions, dissent allows judges in the future to overrule bad law based on the
reasoning of their predecessors, in essence allowing the court, and thus the law and
lawyers, to achieve a more political role by essentially mollifying the losing parties and
encouraging a continuing legal discourse over social issues. Of course, achieving
unanimity on contentious political issues might have been preferred by the winners ex
post, but if the issues were too contentious and the opposition too strong to achieve any
broad consensus, ex ante both sides of the debate would prefer the option value
imbedded in a world with dissent. And, as discussed below, any consensus would in fact
undermine the ability of the law to remain the locus for the determination of the truth of
such questions. Dissent actually allows the Court to continue in its active role post-legal
realism.
IV.

Recent history: To seriatim and back again?

The last 50 years of Supreme Court history since the time of Chief Justice Stone
has been characterized by a proliferation of dissents.198 During the first 140 years of
Graves v. New York ex rel. O’Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 487 (1939) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Id.
197 See Letter from James Madison to Spencer Roane (Sept. 2, 1819), reprinted in, THE FOUNDERS’
CONSTITUTION, A RTICLE 1, SECTION 8, CLAUSE 18, DOCUMENT 15 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds.,
1987).
198 Not only has the number of dissents increased but so has the vitriol. When justices did dissent
during the Marshall Court, they did so reluctantly and apologetically. This was in part due to the collegial
atmosphere that existed in the “boardinghouse Court.” Compare several opening sentences from
dissenting opinions during this period. Those Federalist justices that supported Marshall’s change in
discourse wrote cautiously when dissenting. See Bank of the United States v. Dandridge, 25 U.S. 64, 90
(1827) (Marshall, J. dissenting) (“I should now, as is my custom, when I have the misfortune to differ
from this Court, acquiesce silently in its opinion . . ..”); Mason v. Haile, 25 U.S. 370, 379 (1827)
195
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Court history dissents appeared in less than seven percent of cases; since that time there
have been dissenting opinions in over half of all opinions issued by the Supreme
Court.199 Chief justices from Stone to Rehnquist made no attempt to return to a Court of
consensus. Chief Justice Rehnquist spoke of dissent in matter-of-fact terms200 and
Justice William Brennan wrote of dissent as a “duty”.201 Therefore, the dissent norm
continues to this day.202
A. The modern hybrid approach
Although opinions are still issued as an “opinion of the court” and separate
opinions are merely concurrences or dissents, the practical effect has been a change
back to writing separately—back nearly to the tradition of seriatim. For example, in
Turner Broadcasting System v. FCC, the decision was announced as follows:
Kennedy, J., announced the judgment of the Court and
delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to a portion of
Part II-A-1. Rehnquist, C.J., and Stevens and Souter, JJ.,
(Washington, J. dissenting) (“It has never been my habit to deliver dissenting opinions in cases where it
has been my misfortune to differ from those which have been pronounced by a majority of this Court.”);
Drown v. United States., 12 U.S. 110, 129 (1814) (Story, J. dissenting) (“In this case, I have the misfortune
to differ in opinion from my brethren.”). By contrast the two most frequent dissenters during Marshall’s
reign Justice Johnson and Justice Livingston, both Jefferson appointees and strongly opposed to
Marshall’s change to unanimous opinions, did not hesitate to criticize the majority when dissenting. See
Kirk v. Smith, 22 U.S. 241, 294 (1824) (Johnson, J. dissenting) (“The reasoning upon this cause, must be
utterly unintelligible to those who hear it….”); United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153, 163 (1820) (Livingston,
J. dissenting) (“In a case affecting life, no apology can be necessary for expressing my dissent from the
opinion which has just been delivered.”). Even these attacks on the majority pale by comparison to the
lack of respect shown fellow justices by modern dissenters. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992)
(Scalia, J. dissenting) (writing that the majority opinion was “oblivious to our history,” “incoherent,” a
“jurisprudential disaster,” and “nothing short of ludicrous.”). This type of name calling and hyperbolic
rhetoric is a far cry from the day when justices rarely had the courage to dissent, and when they did, the
guilty feelings compelled them to apologize publicly. As Roscoe Pound noted long ago, such vitriolic
denunciation of other justices is “not good for public respect for courts and law and the administration of
justice.” Roscoe Pound, Cacoethes Dissentiendi: The Heated Judicial Dissent 39 ABA JOURNAL 794, 795
(1953). Although Judge Posner has argued that justices should dissent because dissents play (have played)
an integral part in the development of law, Posner agrees with Pound that the acerbic dissent is both
unnecessary and destructive. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM,
356-57 (1996). Posner criticizes justices as being more concerned about their individual role and less
concerned with the institutional role of the Court. In cases that are relatively straightforward, Posner
agrees with Justice Taft that a definitive rule that may not be perfect or even “correct” is often better than
an uncertain rule. “In such a case a dissent will communicate a sense of the law’s instability that is
misleading.” Id. Accusing judges of worrying about their own legacy and ego, Posner writes that “[f]rom
an institutional perspective it is better for the disagreeing judge not to dissent publicly [in a case which he
knows will not be reconsidered soon], even though such forbearance will make it more difficult for
someone to write the judge’s intellectual biography.” Id. at 357.
199 From 1801 to 1940 (Marshall to Hughes) there were approximately 1231 cases with dissents
out of a total of approximately 17,811 (~7 percent); from 1941 to 1997 (Stone to Rehnquist) there were
about 3877 cases with dissents out of a total of approximately 7434 (~52 percent).
200 WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT: HOW IT WAS, HOW IT IS 302-03 (1987).
201 William J. Brennan Jr. supra note 9 at 437-38 (1986).
202 In 1995 majority opinions represented 43 percent of all opinions. See POSNER, supra note 193
at 358 (1996). See also, Figure 3, supra.
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joined the opinion in full, and Breyer, J., joined except
insofar as Part II-A-1 relied on an anticompetitive rationale.
Stevens, J., filed a concurring opinion. Breyer, J., filed an
opinion concurring in part. O’Connor, J., filed a dissenting
opinion in which Scalia, Thomas, and Ginsburg, JJ.,
joined.203
Dissents, which were once reserved for only the most profound differences of opinion,
are now downright commonplace.
There are several reasons why dissenting opinions might be so common today.
First, there is inertia and custom. Perhaps once the practice is encouraged it is hard to
stop; dissent becomes the discourse of law and will continue to be so until another
fundamental shift in power. This tendency to do what the norm is and has been was one
of the reasons that the age of consensus lasted for almost 100 years after the death of
Marshall. In a classic defense of dissents, Justice Brennan acknowledged that while a
justice’s “general duty is to acquiesce in the rulings of th[e] court,” he stated that it was a
“duty” (and not “an egoistic act”) for each justice to dissent.204
There are also potential political reasons. Vehement dissents signal possible
political drift of the Court that threatens the stability of the country. The audience for
these dissents would be other justices (in an attempt to influence them to vote
differently in the future on similar cases) and/or the public, the press, advocacy groups,
and thus the Congress (in an attempt to influence the confirmation process). Politically,
dissents signal to Court stakeholders (i.e., the public, the press, political groups, and the
Congress) that the Court is wrong or is headed down a dangerous path. In this way,
dissents can be viewed as a way of marshalling groups to influence the
appointment/confirmation process. After all, a series of 5-4 decisions increasing the
power of states vis-à-vis the federal government can all be curtailed or overruled with a
few appointments by a like-minded president.
In both cases, dissent is a tool to seize power within the Court. For example,
consider the justices in the minority on one of the Court’s recent Federalism Cases. The
justices can acquiesce in the ruling silently as was the tradition for the first century and
a half of Court history or can alert Court stakeholders about the errors of the decision.
To do the former creates a perception that the ruling is settled law and that no changes
in Court personnel will change that result. To do the latter would to exactly the opposite.
Dissent, especially when it creates a 5-4 decision, weakens the precedents, and thus
encourages judicial or political responses. Judicially, like-minded lower court judges
Turner Broadcasting System v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997).
Brennan, supra note 9 at 437-38. Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall were two of the
Court’s most frequent and famous dissenters. Not only did these two justices significantly add to the
number of dissenting opinions, but they also introduced a new practice in the Supreme Court—the
publishing of dissents from petitions filed with the Court. As shown on Figure 6, during the past 30 years
there were hundreds of dissents from petitions published by Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall. These
dissents were occasionally in protest of a denial of certiorari, but the vast majority were dissents from
denials to review sentences of capital punishment. In each case for death penalty review received by the
Court, Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall published a dissent that simply stated that in their view
capital punishment violated the cruel and unusual provision of the 8th Amendment. This practice was in
plain violation of well-established Court precedent. The justices were making an overtly political
statement—a statement to the public and to the future.
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may feel emboldened by the dissents, and attempt to narrow the rulings at the circuit
level. In addition, dissents communicate to justices in the future (either current or new
members of the Court), providing them with logic and support for voting to reverse the
holding.
Another reason for the continuing use of dissents is the commonly held belief
that dissents make the law better or make better law. This is based on the power of
famous and not-so-famous dissents throughout history to shape the Court’s future
holdings. Think of the success of Holmes’s dissent in Lochner and Harlan’s dissent in
Plessy.205 As Justice Brennan argued, dissents are offered as a corrective in “the hope
that the Court will mend the error of its ways in a later case.” 206 In addition, like a
concurrence that directly limits the scope of a particular holding, a dissent allows lower
courts or future coalitions of justices to carve out an exception to a majority opinion that
sweeps too broadly. Brennan views these as essential components of judicial
determination of the “truth.” Therefore, Brennan criticized Justice Marshall as
“shut[ting] down the marketplace of ideas” when he instituted the consensus norm. This
marketplace of legal ideas, Justice Brennan argues, is necessary for the creation of
quality legal decisions. In this way, Justice Brennan sees the publishing of multiple
opinions as analogous to legal argument within the courtroom. There is a battle of
justices in legal literature, among judges, and in the forum of public opinion as there is a
battle of witnesses or experts in the courtroom. 207

205 Although the law would be less great without the dissents of Brandeis and Holmes, these
influential and often graceful expositions of the law as how it should be are by far the exception from the
mass of pointless dissents. An example of the inefficient use of separate opinions are the opinions of
Justice Frankfurter. John P. Frank studied the separate opinions of Justice Frankfurter, the most frequent
concurring justice in the history of the Court. Frank found that Frankfurter’s opinions were almost never
cited by anyone. See JOHN P. FRANK, MARBLE PALACE: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN LIFE 126 (1958).
Frank concluded that this was a waste of energy and talent and led to unnecessary ambiguity and
uncertainty in the law. Even Justice Holmes, who was known as the “Great Dissenter,” remarked that
dissents are in most cases “useless and undesirable.” Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S.
197, 400 (1904). Therefore, Holmes was want to dissent and discouraged the practice in all but the most
necessary circumstances. Like the boy who cried wolf, the more one dissents, the less likely dissents are to
be seriously considered. Familiarity of dissent breeds contempt.
206 Brennan, supra note 9 at 430. A classic example of this in our era is the dissenting opinion of
then-Associate Justice Rehnquist in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, in which he
wrote, that the states’ rights principles he and the other dissenters were advocating were “a principle that
will, I am confident, in time again command the support of a majority of this court.” 469 U.S. 528, 580
(1985). After the Court’s stunning series of 5-4 decisions over the past decade upholding the rights of
states against federal interests, Rehnquist has proved to be quite a prognosticator.
207 Another possible explanation for continued dissents is the rise of the law clerk and the
expansion of opinions to resemble law review articles. As the length and legal extent of an opinion
increases, with more and more arguments and footnotes, so too does the grounds for possible
disagreement among the justices. Finally there is the possibility that modern justices are generally more
apt to desire individual recognition. Supreme Court justices now have their own jurisprudence that is
studied in law schools and debated in the legal literature. Furthermore, legal biographies, monographs,
and speeches are increasingly popular so as to tempt individual justices to create their own legacy of
judicial opinions. Justice Scalia and Judge Posner both agree that personal recognition is often the
motivating force behind the trend of frequent dissenting opinions. See Antonin Scalia, The Dissenting
Opinion, J. SUPREME COURT HISTORY 33-44 (1994); POSNER, supra note 193 at 356-57 (1996). The power
of ego should not be underestimated. See, e.g., REHNQUIST, supra note 34 at 141 (commenting on Justice
Franfurter’s proclivity to write separately, and noting the rise in the judicial ego). Especially when justices
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But this isn’t the whole story. The criticism of Marshall and the distinction that
Brennan draws between the current and past practice of dissent is flawed. The Supreme
Court is a normalizing entity within the larger perspective of modernity: like all other
forms of modern power, the Court is about the power of domination; the power of
lawyers and judges and citizens over others—the “govermentalization” of society. The
current practice of dissent in exactly the same terms and achieving exactly the same
results as Marshall’s consensus norm—an increase in Court power. To achieve these
ends for legal power, the Court has adopted various discursive practices throughout its
history depending on the circumstances of the society at the time. When Marshall took
control of the Court, there existed a power vacuum at the national level. The consensus
norm was a way by which the Court could achieve not only power vis-à-vis the other
branches of government, but also power in the form of “governmentalization.” By
increasing the authority of the Court, law as an institution was able to intrude into
previously uncharted territory. Lawyers and judges became more important. The
discourse of law was forever altered in favor of a greater control of judicial authority
over other forms of government and more generally the lives of individual citizens.
At first blush, the rise of the dissenting opinion seems to offer a counterexample
to this theory of Supreme Court normalization. Published separate opinions allow the 11
circuit courts and hundreds of lower federal and state courts to offer their own more
narrow (or broader) interpretation of an opinion. In addition, the dissents allow future
justices to overrule the opinion and reverse the trend of the law. By generally limiting
the authority that comes with a 9-0 opinion, dissents seem to undermine the
normalizing power of the Court. Even Supreme Court justices recognize this impact of
dissenting opinions. Frequently in controversial cases the Court will go out of its way to
achieve a unanimous result. For example in the recent case of Clinton v Jones, a highly
politicized case involving a conflict between the power of the executive and the judiciary,
the Court achieved a 9-0 majority in order to strengthen the Court’s opinion.208 A 5-4
opinion with only “conservative” justices in the majority would have been highly
criticized as a political attempt to undermine the power of the president.209 The result
instead has been an acceptance that can only come when the Court seems united and
apolitical.
Justice Scalia recently wrote about this important role for dissenting opinions.
Scalia argued that dissenting opinions augment the prestige of individual justices while
allowing “genuine” unanimity to have great force when most needed.210 As an example
of when unanimity was “most needed,” Scalia cites to Brown v Board of Education
when the Supreme Court decided a contentious issue of race relations. Although in
Brown and Clinton unanimity was necessary to achieve political acceptance, in the
majority of cases decided today, dissent provides exactly the same result. The argument
are so underpaid relative to what they could earn in the private legal world. Without riches, it is
understandable that justices seek individual power and fame.
208 Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997). In fact this was a 8-0-1 majority in which Justice Breyer
concurred with the majority. However, Justice Breyer’s opinion reads more like a dissent. Breyer probably
joined the majority primarily to achieve unanimity, while writing separately in order to undercut the
majority opinion (?) or to offer future Supreme Court justices an antiprecedent, or to offer lower court
judges an escape hatch around the decision.
209 See, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (reserving, 5-4, the recount of the ballots in the
2000 presidential election by the Florida Supreme Court).
210 See Scalia, supra note 207 at 33-44 (1994).
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is that the practice of dissent provides the Court as an institution with a public and
political acceptance it would be unable to achieve with per curiam opinions.
This is related to the point Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes made about what
is needed to “sustain the court in public confidence”.211 Part of this is revealing the
deliberative nature of the Court’s decision making process. Kevin Stack argues that the
“Supreme Court’s legitimacy depends in part upon the Court reaching its judgments
through a deliberative process.”212 Decision making at the Court is secret. Only the nine
justices attend the conference of justices and the circulation of draft opinions is kept
hidden from public view. Stack writes that given the secrecy of the Supreme Court
process for deciding cases, “dissent is necessary to expose the deliberative character of
the Court’s decisionmaking.”213
In Stack’s view, majorities, concurrences, and dissents published in the US
Reports are a published version of the behind-the-scenes debate in the Supreme Court
conference room; and this public airing of the deliberative process lends political
legitimacy to the institution of the Court. This argument also cuts to the heart of
Jefferson’s criticism of opinions of the court. Jefferson encouraged the use of seriatim
opinions in order to expose each justice to public view, so that they would have the
incentive to consider and reason each case. With individual opinions, justices expose
their competence and legal analysis to the world for criticism. In this way, dissenting
opinions arguably create better justices. With their reputation or career on the line
justices have the proper incentives to consider the case properly.
But this account is not complete. Dissent is not just about modernity’s quest for
deliberative democracy or necessary for the proper functioning of a supreme court, but
also about the type of law being practiced before the Court. Dissent is not only necessary
to ensure the legitimacy of the Court, but gives law the authority to resolve controversial
social issues—it ensures a particular type of Court legitimacy. Just as the opinion of the
court was necessary to increase the power of the Court during the Marshall era, dissent
is the strategy that enables the Court and the law in general to maintain its institutional
position of power and normalization given the highly political nature of the cases the
Court decides today. Dissent ensures legal control over society just as the unanimity
norm was necessary to achieve the same result given the context of the early Nineteenth
century. In this light, unanimity and dissent are means to achieve the same ends—
increased power and a greater role of normalization for courts and lawyers.
In order to test this hypothesis, let us compare the origin of unanimity and the
origin of modern dissent. Despite the long history of openness in the judicial process,
Lord Mansfield instituted a change to unanimity in order to achieve greater legal control
over the commercial law. Chief Justice Marshall seized upon this same power to
increase the reach of the judiciary into new realms. This extension was not simply a
greater centralization of power, but also an increase in establishment of broad norms
and the enabling force behind modernity’s juridical monarchy. For one hundred years,
the unanimity consensus existed in part because of this purpose, but the inertia of
institutional processes and the culture of the legal profession also perpetuated the norm.
During this time, the Supreme Court was deciding similar types of cases. On common
212

HUGHES, supra note 12 at 67-68 (1928).
Kevin M. Stack, The Practice of Dissent in the Supreme Court, 105 YALE L.J. 2235, 2236
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law and primarily economic matters, the Court was generally accepted as legitimate
despite the secrecy of its process.
But then, in the early 1940s the conditions of possibility were such that a
departure from the consensus norm was necessary. The origin of law evolved from
natural law to legal realism—politics entered the law explicitly for the first time. But
legal realism was a symptom of a broader change in society. Issues never before
considered as properly before the Court were thrust into the discourse of law. This
change precipitated a crisis for law and the Court.
How is it possible to address these often highly political subjects without losing
the integrity of the Court? The partial answer is dissent. Separate opinions not only
show society that the process of decision making is legitimate, but also allow those who
oppose a particular result to take comfort that the result may someday be reversed and
written in a law that they would support. This is Brennan’s idea of dissent as a corrective
force. The corrective force of dissents is a two-way street. Both good and bad law are
subject to the force depending on the prevailing political attitude of the Court. Dissents
therefore preserve the ability of the Court to maintain its normalizing power. The
vulnerability of precedents based on less than a unanimous verdict makes the Court and
the Law invulnerable.
Imagine a per curiam opinion that overruled all affirmative action programs or
established a constitutional right to an abortion. Such an opinion would be criticized in
part because of Stack’s notion of legitimacy, but also because opponents of the opinion
would have no legal grounds to continue the fight. A unanimous opinion is so strong as
to be susceptible only to constitutional amendment or impeachment of individual
justices, both of which are unlikely.214 By contrast, dissent allows lower courts, lawyers,
and politicians, to measure the weight of the opinion and to plan a political or legal
counterattack. Dissents lead to ambiguity and hope of change, both of which are fertile
ground for legal fights and more lawyers. Litigation strategy often depends on the
strength of precedents or the voting records of the current occupants of the Court.
Without such possibilities for counterattack, the opinion would carry more weight, but
the integrity of law and the Court might well come under siege from more dangerous
from political forces. Possible political reactions are impeachment, change in Court
composition or jurisdiction,215 or a constitutional amendment. Congress’ power is robust
here, as the Constitution grants it the “power to decide how much appellate jurisdiction,
and of what sort, the Supreme Court would enjoy.”216

Jefferson wrote about how difficult impeachment would be, and how this interplays with
judicial discourse. See Letter of Thomas Jefferson to Edward Livingston, in 16 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON MEMORIAL EDITION 114 (Lipscomb and Bergh, eds., 1903-04). ("I . . . [am] against caucusing
judicial decisions, and for requiring judges to give their opinions seriatim, every man for himself, with his
reasons and authorities at large, to be entered of record in his own words. A regard for reputation, and the
judgment of the world, may sometimes be felt where conscience is dormant, or indolence inexcitable.
Experience has proved that impeachment in our forms is completely inefficient."); see also Letter from
Thomas Jefferson to Spencer Roane, in THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 1904-05 (Paul Leicester Ford
ed.) (“For experience has already shown that the impeachment it has provided is not even a scarecrow . .
..”).
215 See infra note 164.
216 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 20 at 142.
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For example, Robert Bork, Patrick Buchanan, and other political activists, have
argued that the Congress should be able to reverse Supreme Court decisions by vote.217
The “legislative veto” is not as odd as it sounds, having been used in England and in
colonial America. In fact, the constitutions of states such as New York, New Jersey,
Connecticut, Rhode Island, and others granted the power to review supreme court
decisions to the legislative, executive, or some combination thereof.218 The
Bork/Buchanan proposal did not garner serious support, despite the outrage at many
Court decisions such as Roe v Wade, perhaps in part because of the practice of dissent
leaves open the opportunity for new rules tomorrow. Dissent undermines the force of
the opinion and allows opponents to hope for the day when they will control the Court.
Paradoxically by undermining the authority of the Court, dissent increases the power of
the Court and the law by insulating it from attacks like those of Bork and Buchanan.219
For another example of a political attack on the Court, consider the state of
Georgia’s response to the Court’s opinion in Chisholm. Although the tactic of reversing a
specific opinion with a constitutional amendment has been used only twice in Supreme
Court history,220 this may be attributable in part to the fact that the losing parties before
the Court may find sufficient solace in the power of dissenting opinions to achieve
similar ends.
Because it is extremely difficult to amend the Constitution, those opposed to
particular decisions may try to use the courts to achieve their ends. Take the example of
abortion. After the decision in Roe the question of abortion was no more resolved than it
had been prior to the Court’s opinion. However, after Roe not only was abortion lawful,
but the issue of abortion was “lawyerized” or “judicialized”. The locus of the dispute was
now the legal system and all its components of domination. Protests now moved from
the statehouse to the Supreme Court and those opposed to abortion seized upon the
dissenting opinions and the hope of a change in Court reasoning or personnel to win
their battle for the “truth.” Dissent keeps potentially extrajudicial subjects such as
217 For example, Bork proposed congressional review of Supreme Court decisions or curtailing the
scope of judicial review. See Robert H. Bork, Our Judicial Oligarchy, 67 FIRST THINGS 21, 21 (1996). Bork
argued that "[t]he most important moral, political and cultural decisions affecting our lives are steadily
being removed from democratic control,” and that a “change in our institutional arrangements” is the only
thing that “can halt the transformation of our society and culture by judges.” Id. His solution: “Decisions
of courts might be made subject to modification or reversal by majority vote of the Senate and the House
of Representatives. Alternatively, courts might be deprived of the power of constitutional review.” Id. This
point of view is a departure for Bork, who argued previously that a veto over the Supreme Court was
dangerous because if could be use destructively as well to overturn the “Court’s essential work.” See
ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE L AW 55 (1997) (“If twothirds of the Senate might have overruled Dred Scott, then perhaps it is imaginable that two-thirds might
have overruled a case like Brown v. Board of Education. That depends on the passions of the moment,
but is obvious that unpopular rulings may be easily overturned as improper ones. There is, after all, no
reason to think that over time the Senate will be a more responsible interpreter of the Constitution than
the Court.”).
218 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 20 at 139-40. The final state to move away from this system was
Rhode Island, which abandoned the practice by 1860. Id.
219 See also Robert F. Nagel, The High (and Mighty) Court, W ALL S T. J., Jun. 30, 2000
(disparaging the current role of the Court in deciding cases such as partial-birth abortion and school
prayer, and arguing that the “basic purpose of contemporary judicial activism is to maintain the
institutional prestige of the federal judiciary.”).
220 The 11th Amendment—Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793); and the 16th Amendment—
Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan, 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
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abortion and affirmative action within the purview of the law courts, in just the same
way that Mansfield brought commercial disputes into the ambit of the common law.
B. The Roberts gambit?
A fourth potential discursive change is afoot. At his confirmation hearings, Chief
Justice Roberts expressed a narrow conception of the role of the Court in public policy
matters. Using a baseball analogy, Roberts defined the Supreme Court’s role as simply
“calling balls and strikes”, rather than deciding the fundamental rules of the game. He
distinguished himself from politically like-minded justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence
Thomas, by proffering himself as, to use Cass Sunstein’s terms, a “minimalist” rather
than a Scalia or Thomas-like “visionary”. Some doubt the seriousness of this claim, the
theoretical possibility of its existence, or its application to practice in the first two terms
of the Roberts Court, but Roberts has stated publicly that he affirmatively wants the
Court to return to a Marshall-like consensus norm. Critics object to his proposed reform
of discourse. Geoffrey Stone recently opined that Supreme Court opinions are not about
deciding outcomes but announcing legal principles that will give guidance to lower
courts, police, citizens, and so on—they are the creators of legal truth grids, and small or
narrow grids are unhelpful. Stone writes:
Whenever the Supreme Court decides a case “narrowly,” resolving only the
particular dispute before it, it leaves the rest of the society and rest of the legal
system in the dark. When the Supreme Court leaves important issues unresolved,
everyone else must guess about what they can and cannot do under the law.
Lower courts are free to disagree with one other, with the result that the scope of
constitutional rights will vary randomly from state to state and district to district
throughout the nation. Unnecessary uncertainty is not a healthy state of affairs
when it comes to the freedom of speech, the freedom of religion, or the right of
the people to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures. It may be
easier for the Court to decide cases “narrowly,” but it creates chaos for everyone
else in the system.221
Stone also echoes Jefferson. He writes that opinions without dissent are an
“abdication” of judicial responsibility to expose judicial decision making to public
critique: “The legitimacy of the judicial branch rests largely on the responsibility of
judges to explain and justify their decisions in opinions that can be publicly read,
analyzed, and criticized.” Consensus decisions that paper over differences do not do this.
Here we see Jefferson’s arguments about transparency and accountability. Stone also
believes dissent is essential to overruling bad law, and he, like Jefferson, cites examples
of cases in which results we think are right were first suggested in earlier dissents.222
Geoffrey Stone, Chief Justice Roberts and the Role of the Supreme Court, The [University of
Chicago] Faculty Blog (Feb. 2, 2007), available at
http://uchicagolaw.typepad.com/faculty/2007/02/chief_justice_r.html#more.
222 Id. (“It is also important to note that some of the most influential opinions in the history of the
Supreme Court were concurring and dissenting opinions. Although they did not command the support a
majority of the Justices at the time, the eventually won the day because of the force of their reasoning.
Familiar examples, to name just a few, include Justice Harlan’s famous dissenting opinion in Plessy v.
221
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Squelching dissent would “degrade the quality of the Court’s work and undermine the
public’s and the legal profession’s ability to evaluate the seriousness and persuasiveness
of the Court’s reasoning. In the long run, it would undermine the Court itself.”223
Although Jefferson and Professor Stone make the same arguments about the
value of dissent, remember that Jefferson wanted to decrease the power of the Court,
while presumably Professor Stone wants to increase it or, at least, keep it the same. This
exposes these arguments, as well as the arguments of their opponents—Marshall and
Roberts respectively—for what they are: justifications for a particular political role for
the Court. The critiques are instrumental only. Neither Jefferson nor Stone believe that
dissent makes better law in the abstract, but rather that separate opinions from that of
the Court were necessary for an expression of their particular preference for the locus of
legal power. Jefferson wanted a weak Court so power could be located in the legislature,
presidency, and the states, and dissent was the means to weaken the Court given its
institutional position at the time. Stone wants a strong Court and dissent appears to be
the means to strengthen the Court at this time.
To put it another way, taking Chief Justice Roberts at his word, the preference for
unanimity does not obviously sit well with the current stable of cases and the main
argument of this paper—it seems implausible to suggest that Roberts can achieve
unanimity on questions of race, gender, school choice, homosexual rights, the War on
Terror, and other politically contentious issues. So what is his rhetoric about? One
possibility that is consistent with the theme of this paper, is that Roberts wants to
decrease the power of the Court in American society, and his mechanism for that is
same as that used by Mansfield, Marshall, and Stone, just in the opposite direction.
While his predecessors used a change in opinion-delivery practices to increase the
power of the Court over issues of the day, Roberts may be advocating a discursive
change to decrease this power. In all cases, discourse reflects power in same way that
form follows function.
V.

Conclusion

It is not surprising that we observe opinion-delivery practices of Anglo American
courts suited to the particular times. This fact seems almost self evident, but it does
rebut claims that the current practice of writing separately is theoretically and ceteris
paribus superior to other methods. The lesson from history is that allowing or
forbidding dissent is not about getting better law per se, but about achieving some
defined role for courts. This role is typically more power over disputes.
We have seen that the history of debates about the opinion delivery practices of
Anglo-American courts has been about court power. Those arguing for the right to
dissent have sometimes been about limiting court power (e.g., Jefferson) and sometimes
about increasing it (e.g., Brennan). We should view the proposal from Chief Justice
Roberts in this light. Roberts’s nostalgia for the Marshall era of unanimity is about
reducing the power of the Court, both by narrowing individual holdings to open up
decision space for other courts, and also to limit the kind of cases the Court hears. A
Ferguson, the pivotal dissenting and concurring opinions of Justices Holmes and Brandeis in a series of
free speech decisions following World War I, and Justice Robert Jackson’s landmark concurring opinion
in the Steel Seizure case.”).
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consensus norm is incompatible with deciding the Court’s recent docket of cases, at least
in the broad manner in which they have historically been decided. In this day and age,
narrowness and minimalism go hand in hand with consensus, while breadth and judicial
power go hand in hand with dissent. Of course, as this paper has shown, it was not
always this way, and it may not be again. This pattern of punctuated equilibrium is
bound repeat itself again and again. Dissent is a powerful tool of the law. And because it
is a tool, dissent is used to achieve the ends of the law, whatever they may be.
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25 US 64 1827 Marshall
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26 US 46 1828 Johnson
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26 US 469 1828 Johnson
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26 US 110 1828 Johnson
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27 US 449 1829 Johnson
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28 US 346 1830 Johnson
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Patapsco Insurance Co v Coulter
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Jackson
US v Robertson
30 US 641 1831 Baldwin
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Cherokee Nation v Georgia
30 US 1 1831 Thompson
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Winship v Bank of the US
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Fisher v Cockerell
Page v Lloyd
Doe v Winn
US v Arredondo
Ex Parte Tobias Watkins
Wheaton v Peters
Harrison v Nixon
Beers v Haughton
US v Bailey

-
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